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This timely work concerns itself with a methodological
investigation of the complex phenomenon of threat assessment
at the Defense Department level. Through the device of
propaedeutic and heuristic discussion the controversial
aura surrounding present day threat assessment is explored.
Several methods that have been used or might possibly be
used to assess threat are outlined. The paper concludes
with the optimistic remark that with further effort a
pragmatic and reproducible method of assessing threats to
this nation should be forthcoming.
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I. PREFACE
The author was first attracted to this subject by the
lack of documentation dealing with the subject of threat
assessment methodologies and the cavalier construction of
threat assessments in many studies. The original title
which was envisioned for this work was "The Use of Subjective
Factors in the Assessment of Threat." After this initial
formulation, several weeks of research indicated that finding
methods to utilize subjective factors in threat assessment
necessitated finding out how threat was assessed in current
studies. The research was then reoriented and the title was
changed to read "The Assessment of Threat as Practiced in
Systems Analysis." However, further research uncovered that
no cut-and-dry method existed to assess threat and certainly
no method had been constructed to specifically handle this
complex problem. Thus, through this process the author
finally entitled this paper "An Investigation of the Assess-
ment of Threat." This title implies an uncovering of methods,
among other things. In this sense, the implication was true.
This paper certainly did not find existing threat evaluation
procedures profuse in the literature or methods that were
universally accepted. The research effort presented evidence
of a miasma of concepts, methodologies and philosophies that
were interpreted as methods used to assess threat. A dis-
cussion of why these concepts, methodologies and philosophies
should be used to attack the assessment of threat was never
found in the literature.
The construction of this paper and the ordering of the
arguments into the particular sections that follow was pre-
meditated and purposeful. Section II, the introductory
section, was intended to entice the reader to go on by pre-
senting the fundamental motivation of this research which
was the proper allocation of defense resources. It further
served as an introduction to the writing style of the
author. Section III informs the reader of the author's
perspectives which guided the research for this paper.
Section IV serves as a propaedeutic and a heuristic base for
discussion of the nature of the problem of threat assessment
in the next section. Section IV touches on the myriad factors
that plague defense planners concerning this problem and
attempts to give insight into why these aspects are relevant
when dealing with threat assessment. Unless the reader has
successfully coped with the assessment of threat, the reading
of Section IV cannot be omitted. Section V describes the
nature of the problem of threat assessment and emphasizes why
this nature cannot as yet be fully outlined. Section VI
covers five categories of methods that classified present
methods that have or could have been used in the assessment
problem. The last section presents the conclusions, recom-
mendations and proposals for further research that the paper
generated
.
Almost all readers will understand every theme contained
in the introductory and perspectives sections (Sections II
and III). The discussion section (Section IV) should bring
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the average reader to the tentative conclusion that the
problem of threat assessment is entirely too complex to be
solved at this time. The section dealing with the problem's
nature (Section V) should again reinforce this tentative
conclusion. It is the author's hope that the methods section
(Section VI) will allow the reader insight into just how one
may come to grips with threat assessment in the future.
Hopefully, this section will force the reader to reassess his
tentative conclusions concerning the impossibility of prop-
erly assessing threat. The concluding section may serve as
a springboard for further thesis research at the Naval Post-
graduate School.
The preceding predictions of the reader's reactions to
this paper are parallel to the author's reaction during the
conduct of the research and writing of the paper. At this
writing a sense of optimism affects the author concerning




Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said today
the United States will have to consider possible
production of a new strategic bomber or deploy more
strategic missiles at sea if the Soviet Union's
offensive threat continues to mount .
1
Senator William Proximire said today that mil-
itary spending should be cut by $10 billion. "We
found from expert testimony we took that the Russians
are not ten feet tall," the Wisconsin Democrat said
in releasing a report by a subcommittee of the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress. Mr. Proximire is
chairman of the subcommittee and vice-chairman of
the parent panel. "In fact, based on our military
outlays and economic strength," he said, "If we are
six feet tall the Russians by comparison are three
feet tall and the Chinese are six inches tall."
. . .
Mr. Proximire ' s assessment that the Soviet Military
threat is half that of the United States was based
on testimony of what the Subcommittee Report called
eight experts on Soviet affairs, who estimated
Russia's gross national product at half that of the
United States. "While it would be unrealistic to
underestimate one's potential adversary," the report
said, "The Subcommittee is disturbed by a tendency
of some to magnify the strength of the Soviet
military establishment. Expenditure of unnecessary
sums for defense leads to misallocation of our own
resources and therefore weakens this nation in the
long run . "2
These statements are typical of the controversial aura
that seems to surround threat assessment today. The realis-
tic quantification of threat, whatever threat may be, and the
relation of this assessment to Department of Defense spending
Associated Press dispatch, The Monterey Peninsula
Herald
,
(California), January 7, 1970.
2 Associated Press dispatch, New York Times , December 28,
1969-
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and programs is extremely difficult. Or is it? Many so-
called experts are quick to present their method of dealing
with the problem. Political analysts seem to blithely count
Russian missiles, dissect possible intents to use these
missiles and through some thought process equate this anal-
ysis to the proper amount of missiles, troops, bomb shelters
or whatever that must be acquired for Defense Department
programs. Some military thinkers utilizing experience and
judgment, make the same connection justifying their assess-
ment with historical examples and the assessment of potential
enemies' possible intents. Most students of analysis of
defense spending admit nothing other than a threat exists at
some primitive and universally understandable level and pro-
ceed from there with schemata to counter the threat. On the
other hand, many dismiss all assessments with the exception
of the most general predictions, as looking into the future
and an impossible task anyway.
Our national resources and the annual budget have in-
finite uses in the areas of strategic defense, environment,
population control, urban renewal and of course, the prose-
cution of a very real, limited conflict, Viet Nam. An
economist would say we are faced with maximizing "the problems
solved" given a limited budget allocation. With the largest
portion of the Federal Budget, the Defense Department offers
the hope of the greatest cutbacks and therefore, further
reapplication of the budget to other critical problem areas.
11
Alain Enthoven emphasized that, "One simply cannot decide
rationally on a national security policy independently of the
quantitative aspects of enemy capabilities." The fundamental
theme here is the more accurate the assessment of threat the
less waste of resources to cope with it.
This paper does address accurate threat estimation. This
paper does not address the relationship between political
decision-making and rational models based on accurate threat
estimation. This paper does not survey methods used by the
Defense Department that address threat assessment, although
the paper inherently touches on them.
This paper is not cast in the role of a methodological
standard providing a basis for determining the extent to
which research dealing with threat is controlled and hence,
scientific. But if there exists such a methodological stand-
ard in systems analysis this paper is intended to assist in
making explicit the conception of the best approach to threat
assessment research procedures in an effort to facilitate
future improvements in both the standard and one's efforts to
h
approximate it.
In the end, the attempt to investigate possible methodol-
ogy for verification of threat assessments is equivalent to
the attempt to outline a scientific discipline of inter-
country relationships. Do not take this paper so. But rather
3 Enthoven, A. C, "Operations Research at the National
Policy Level," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (Indus-




Ackoff, R. L., Scientific Method Optimizing Applied
Research Decisions (John Wiley and Sons, Inc
.
, 1962 ) , pp . 6-7.
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take it as an attempt to preposition one's intellect to
vilify anyone claiming its accomplishment.
Thus, what can be answered by this paper is a function
of the reader's interest in the problem and the value of
coping with research attempting to quantify threat. The
endeavor was to provide propaedeutic and heuristic bases for
further attempts at threat assessment.
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III. PERSPECTIVES
Implicitly, every paper is written from personally
ascribed perspectives. The nature of the problem of threat
assessment dictates an explanation of why these particular
perspectives were set down.
It is the contention of this paper that in many circles
threats to this country seem to be well understood phenomena
for the individuals concerned. For example, it seems suffi-
cient that the public of the United States be aware of the
general nature of certain existing threats to this country.
This allows understanding of the legislative and policy proc-
esses that go on in relation to countering these threats.
However, knowledge of the general nature of threats to this
country is not sufficient for decision-makers who can do
something about threats. These considerations are why these
perspectives were set down. The perspectives are for the
reader to adopt to insure the reader not to cling to his own
perhaps naive points of view.
A perspective may be defined as the selection of a
position from which to view something one is desirous of
viewing. With the thought in mind that the something may be
unviewable, the following perspectives were used to view the
assessment of threat.
A. DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH
Research that is directed toward the solution
of problems that can be divided into two major classes,
1H
evaluative and developmental. An evaluative problem
is one in which the alternative courses or action are
completely specified in advance and the solution
consists of selecting the "best" of these. A devel-
opmental problem involves the search for (and perhaps
construction or synthesis of) instruments which yield
a course of action that is better than any available
at the time.
5
This paper is developmental research which is searching
for methods that yield policies that are pragmatic in the
sense that they realistically and rationally cope with threat
assessment and successfully relate its quantification to
defense spending.
The study of scientific methods is frequently referred to
as methodology. The objective of methodology is the improve-
ment of the procedures and criteria employed in the conduct
of scientific research. For this reason, methodology is
often referred to as the logic of science. And for this
reason, this particular perspective can be said to view the
assessment of threat from the standpoint of the logic of
threat assessment methods.
B. SUFFICIENCY OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The installation of systems analysis and its basis in
c
quantification, at the national policy level prompted this
investigation. Policy makers were thought to have been
5 Ibid., p. 24.
c
Hitch, C. J., "Development and Salient Features of the
Programming System," A Modern Design for Defense Decision
(Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966 ) , pp . 84-85
.
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driven to this method in order to have a surrogate for expe-
rience because of increasing complexities which confronted
7
them. It was felt the old patriotic emotional process
supposedly employed in the past must take a back seat to
intellectual processes such that one's attention is to the
o
question of what's right, not who's right,
It is abundantly clear that the Defense Department has
acted as if a real and palpable threat existed and that with
the tools at hand was able to justify its plans and programs
Q
in relation to this threat. It was not clear that the meth-
od of systems analysis was sufficient to adequately partake
in this justification. Therefore, this perspective sought to
view systems analysis as practiced in the Department of De-
fense with a critical eye in an attempt to evaluate its
sufficiency as a method used in threat assessment.
C. MEASUREMENTS
Since the perspective of the sufficiency of systems anal-
ysis was adopted it was in context to question the measure-
ments one must have taken in order to quantify threat to
7
Quade, E. S. and Boucher, W. I., (ed.), Systems Anal-





Enthoven, A. C, "Choosing Strategies and Selecting
Weapon Systems," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (Indus-
trial College of the Armed Forces, 1966 ) , p . 148.
Q
Green, P., Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deter-
rence (Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. T8~!
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practice systems studies. In his book, Prediction and
Optimal Decision , Churchman has stated, "All description
methodologically entails prediction. In general, all meas-
urement takes place within the context of a theory."
Churchman further argued that deciding what sort of measure-
ment to take to represent concepts is essentially a decision-
making activity. This implies measuring may not be properly
located in the realm of systems analysis. Since the objective
of measurement could be accomplished in several ways and was
dependent upon one's decisions, could analysts decide what
to measure or should decision-makers have been involved?
Once this question had been resolved and measurements were
attempted, one found no theory of measurements as a guide in
the conduct of measuring. Analysts do not know why they go
about quantification in the manner they do. Each one devel-
oped his own theory and conducted his measuring from this
basis. These perspectives took the place of a theory of
thesis construction and were developed by the researcher.
The method of systems analysis can be characterized as ways
of creating on-the-spot theories to solve complex problems
of choice. Were the theories of measurement constructed by
analysts sufficient to characterize threat? This perspective
was adopted to examine some of these theories. Again it is
appropriate to cite Churchman.









In other words, theories of science (in this paper,
threat assessment) are not tested by a set of data
arrived at independently of the theory itself. Data-
collectors are not objective arbiters of truth who
have never been embroiled in the disputes they arbi-
trate. Data-collectors have used a theory to collect
their data. Unification of specific effort occurs
when we can understand the relation between a theory
and the theory of data collection used to test the
theory. 12 (Comments in parentheses mine)
D. BASIC SUBJECTIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
There exists primitive notions in our society that scien-
tific activity in general is a cold hard analysis with
objective methods being utilized. Further notions declare
13
science as independent of the personalities involved.
These notions were rejected in this paper. The fundamental
subjectivity that partakers in scientific activity display
does bend and mold science in various directions. Scientific
activity was thought of as a way of accomplishing some objec-
tive in a particular manner and invented and pursued by man-
kind (with all that entails). As applied to all objectives,
no value judgment was made as to whether science is better
than common sense. Had this judgment been made prior to this
paper, no need would have existed to write it.
To use Ackoff's apt phrasing, the perspective adopted was
Quantification at any stage depends on quali-
fication. What is qualified at one stage may be
12 Ibid., p. 133.
13 Enthoven, A. C, "Choosing Strategies and Selecting
Weapon Systems," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (Indus-
trial College of the Armed Forces, 1966), p. 139-
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quantified at another, but at any stage some
qualitative judgments are required . Conse-
quently, progress in science not only is a
function of an increased capacity to quantify
efficiently (i.e., to measure) but also depends .
on an increased capacity to qualify efficiently
.
(Underscoring mine)
Once some ultimately right belief toward scientific
activity is discarded and acceptance that all human activity
is fundamentally subjective, one can then view the objectiv-
ity of science as not how right or wrong it is, but as what
objectives science seeks to achieve. Clear precise objec-
tives with well thought-out procedures to attempt their
accomplishment is the ultimate attraction of scientific
activity. Science attaches a sense to human existence and
orders human activity to realize more quickly human objec-
tives. So do hunches.
E. APPLICATIONS
Analytic techniques of systems analysis can be applied to
defense and military problems in a spectrum ranging from the
routine to the vital one-time decisions of top-level national
security decision-makers. This spectrum may be divided into
the following categories: management of operations, choice
of tactical alternatives, design and development of weapons
15
systems and determination of major policy alternatives.
This paper endeavors to perceive the problem of threat
assessment from the viewpoint of the last two categories:
systems design and development and policy determination.
14
Ackoff, op. cit .
,
p. 21.




The fiscal year 1969 found the United States spending
$79.16 billion on defense alone. Net expenditures for that
-1 c
same year of the national government were $184,764 billion.
More than forty-two percent of the nation's budget went to-
ward defense. Defense against what? is one of the questions
this paper investigates in an attempt to critically examine
how we as a nation go about justification of this fantastic
sum in the common defense. The defense against threats to
this country is a complex problem area. This problem in-
cludes the enumeration of threat in some manner. It may be
that systems analysis and the scientific method cannot
enumerate threat. But prior to this conclusion investigation
is dictated into the sufficiency of systems analysis and the
theory underlying the method.
For those who scoff at the implied premise that threat
can be measured, be reminded that the analysis of the
"unanalyzable" and the conception of the "inconceivable" have
given great impetus to the progress of mankind. Be also
-1 c
1970 Information Please Almanac, Atlas and Yearbook
(24th ed., Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 189.
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reminded that concepts that are regarded as Indefinable by
the world's great intellects may imply the need to reorient
the manner in which these concepts are regarded. The struc-
ture of a complex concept may never be discerned but the
function of the concept in relation to the purposes of man-
17kind may be very helpful indeed.
For example j a definition of threat used in the Defense
Department does not exist. Yet the Department uses functional
relations to the concept of threat, which act as measures .
These measures can then be used to justify expenditures in
relation to the threat. The very essence of the problem dis-
cussed here lies in whether one may conceptualize threat.
The problem of threat and the notion of its use as a primitive
concept will be taken up later.
Systems analysis is initiated as a method because of the
threat of impending competitive action. (This statement can
be accepted if one disregards the troublesome area of threat
definition.) The competitor in this case is a potential
political enemy. System studies are also initiated to modify
operational systems to take advantage of current develop-
ments. Of course, one hopes the systems of the Defense
Department are generated in relation to potential enemy
threats. Finally, systems analysis can be employed because
of orders of decision-makers. One can safely say that the
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decision-maker in the Defense Department is probably (or at
least should be) motivated by some form of perceived enemy
potential to harm the United States. (To conclude then that
all systems analysis activity is primarily based on some
perceived threat is tempting, but quite naive. This paper
will address this nexus between systems analysis and its
initiation later.) This present discussion is biased toward
the ideal that the defense establishment exists for the
common defense of the United States. Using the word defense
in this context necessarily brings to mind the word threat .
Without threat one needs no defense and so on. What needs
clarification here is that the Department of Defense is a
human construction and organized and run by men. The Depart-
ment's animation is a product of its organization and that
organization's membership. The membership's interpretation
of what the common defense entails is of interest here.
This interpretation and the actions (in the guise of programs)
used to carry it out result in national defense. It is clear
then that no matter how one defines defense or threat, the
true understanding of these concepts in the Department of
Defense lies in investigating the actions of the Department
to deal with them.
In the past the programs and plans of the Department of
Defense have been scrutinized from every aspect. Discussion
then centered on whether these programs and plans in fact
accomplished the common defense and effectively coped with
the threat to the nation. The planning, programming and
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budgeting system has as its self-pro claimed purpose to equate
projects to budget allocations and specific enemy potential.
Critics seized on the comparison of these projects and their
costs disregarding how they were generated. Congressional
hearings go on today dealing with this very subject. The
object of this discussion is to present the reader with the
fact that today the justification of defense plans and pro-
grams is logically dependent on perceived threat. At this
writing this dependency probably does not exist in a ration-
ally reconstructable manner. In other words, can government
planners equate existent and proposed systems to some threat
via some reproducible method that can be followed by other
individuals such that the same systems result? If this
dependency does not exist then necessarily by the previously
mentioned reasoning those same planners must not completely
understand either the organization of the Department of
Defense, its membership or its actual functioning, or all
three. To make a conclusion about the preceding statement
is not the present object. The present object is to insure
insight into the structure of the problem.
Setting aside the difficulties previously discussed con-
cerning the understanding of the actual functioning of the
Defense Department, the relationship of the United States to
potential enemies is taken up. This relationship is the
main problem. If researchers could dissect the organization
and membership of enemy governments, learn of their function-
ing and its relationship as a potential threat to the United
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States, the problem could be solved. Minimum expenditures
could be arrived at straightforwardly to counter these
threats. Unfortunately, our understanding of foreign estab-
lishments is as far away as respective foreign researchers
are in understanding their own country's organizations and
motives. (One must at least suspect this to be true if De-
fense Department planners have the sort of problems indicated
in the last paragraph.)
Where is the starting point then? Does one wait until
a systems study is indicated in relation to some vague poten-
tiality to construct a theory of threat assessment to support
the study? Can one equate political analysis of one's enemies
to systems studies? What operational theorems does one have
on which to fall back?
As previously implied no theory of inter-country relation-
ships in rigorous enough format exists to construct inputs to
systems studies. Many theories or disciplines, if you will,
such as political science, deterrence theory, arms control
and international relations exist, but they are incompatible
with the present conduct of systems analysis. In fact, the con-
troversy which exists between the aforementioned disciplines
in regard to potential threats is chaotic. Leaving the
perspective of the government establishment, one is accosted
by pamphlets, articles, books, speeches, news reporting and
all manner of voiced opinion relative to or purporting to
assess potential threats to this country. The material
available is staggering. Again, where is the starting point
for systems studies in relation to this material?
24
At this juncture it is appropriate to discourse about
principles or laws of science . A principle or law is a
convenient way of recording a scientific observer's observa-
tions about some phenomenon. The activity of observing is
a continuous one requiring reinterpretation of the principle
or law or they must be discarded as no longer helpful. An
analogy to demonstrate this definition is the one concerning
the ancient belief that the universe was made of fire, water
and earth. This principle suited man until classical physics
and more recently nuclear physics dictated its complete
refutation
.
Now, similarly the laws concerning the behavior of
countries presenting threats to the United States are con-
structs of the observer of these countries. Consequently,
any laws of value, in order to remain valuable, must be capa-
ble of reinterpretation. To maintain one's laws one reinter-
prets. This methodological idea is credited to Kant who
claimed that we would not observe regularity in nature, had
19
we not first put it there. It follows that we would not
observe regularity in countries' behavior had we not first
put it there. Making a round turn the observation that com-
pletes this discussion is twofold. If one claims no laws of
inter-country behavior, can one possibly observe this behavior
accurately? Furthermore, can this behavior be observed with
enough precision to be useful to system analysts?
19? Churchman, op. cit .
, pp. 2 3^-2 35
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A recurring theme in the present section has been that
the basic rigor of dependence on numbers and measurements of
systems analysis makes this method incompatible with other
disciplines that traditionally have handled threat analysis.
Quade and Boucher observe that
:
Today, analyses no longer look as "analytical"
as they did in the past. To an increasing extent
they deal with strategy as well as with tactics-
with the ability to achieve general foreign policy
objectives, rather than merely with the ability of
weapon systems to influence the character of a
single military clash. ... We now realize that
the impact of subjective con siderations -such as
the system's flexibility, its compatability with
other systems (some yet unborn), its contributions
to national prestige abroad, and its effect on
domestic political constraints-can play as important
a role in the choice of alternatives as any calcula-
tion of war outcomes. In addition, we realize that
such intangibles as the extent to which superiority
in residual forces can be effectively used to coerce
the enemy to discontinue the conflict or the percep -




must be taken into account. Thus, it
should be no surprise that many of the component
studies and even a major part of the over-all anal- p n
ysis, are verbal rather than quantitative in nature.
(Underscoring mine)
It must be submitted that these observations are essentially
correct, but the embellishment of analysis with "verbal rather
than quantitative" reporting methods is begging the question.
Rigorous (analytical) results and the complete repetition of
results by other researchers using a study's methods are in
part the scientific method. Substitution of verbal analysis
of threat in place of striving to develop methods to measure
it, will never solve the measurement problem (or resolve it).
Now analysts must wear two hats when dealing with threat





assessment: one of a systems analyst, the other of a
political scientist. Green [Ref. 7] is especially damaging
to the reputation of systems analysts' ability to properly
don the hat of a political scientist.
Quade and Boucher go on to cite Alton Fry:
However frustrating and difficult may be the
attempt to perceive and project the probable
intentions and behavior of a potential adversary,
prudence demands that the effort be made. Only
with some appreciation of the other side's motives
and some notion of the underlying values which
influence its decision-makers can we hope to
induce behavior on their part that is favorable to
us. . . . Obviously the policy-maker must use this
kind of qualitative research and analysis with the
greatest caution. Since all the important variables
may not even have been identified, much less anal-
yzed, ... In this world of subjective probabilities,
of ill-defined and personally ascribed confidence
levels, the investment of positions which cannot be
scientifically verified may tend to distort the anal-
ytical contexts, to polarize discussion along
artificial lines, and to pervert the entire process
(of analysis) into sterile controversy. Both analyst
and user must constantly guard against the inclination
to form unjustifiably rigid convictions and to develop
a false confidence that any particular model or
solution accurately conforms to the real problems of
politics and strategy. 21 (Comments in parentheses
mine)
The development of methods of identification of Alton Pry's
"important variables" and measures of their ranges to an
extent that policy makers could rely on systems studies
dealing with "problems of politics and strategy" (or threat
assessment) should be a major goal in systems studies. This
goal should not be discarded because one is able to substitute
21
Fry, A., "United States Space Policy: An Example of
Political Analysis," Systems Analysis and Policy Planning
(American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 322-323-
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a well-turned phrase for its accomplishment, or because
"prudence" has not "demanded" convincingly. This goal should
be striven for to further the horizon of the usefulness of
systems analysis and its product to further the national
defense
.
All too often, the definition of threat is not taken
seriously by scientists. The notion of threat as a basic
and primitive concept in need of no definition can be accepted
in one's everyday life only. At the level of national secu-
rity threat, its definition takes on great importance. This
nation felt threatened by Communism in Southeast Asia. As a
result, fantastic sums were allocated to prevent the domino
theory from becoming reality. In fact, at this writing
fantastic sums are still allocated for this purpose.
"The content of (or meaning contained in) a definition
should take into account the objectives of the researcher and
22
common and scientific usage of the concept." Whether the
"common and scientific usage" of threat can be provided at
some universally acceptable level and embodied in a defini-
tion that accounts for this country's objectives in research-
ing threat cannot be determined at this time. What is clear
is that too many times this undertaking is poorly done if
accomplished at all. If the reader will turn back to the
first and second opening paragraphs in the introduction, he
will perceive no definitions of threat by either Mr. Laird




or Mr. Proximire . One will see a reliance on the notion of
threat embodying some primitive understandable concept. This
is in fact true. But can this nation base its expenditures
for defense (to the sum of $79 billion in 1969) on this
notion? One would think not.
The present methodology dictates development of wide
ranges or options at great expense without knowledge that
any of these major weapon systems and national policy contin-
gencies will ever be used. The lead times of many of these
systems are as long as ten years (due to the embodiment of
wide ranging capabilities within each system for unknown
contingencies, one would think).
The emphasis of Defense Department spending on the devel-
opment of multi-billion dollar systems has an effect on a
potential adversary. This effect is unknown, but most likely
some effect does exist. The studies supporting these systems
should deal with it. The analysis of this effect might serve
to shelve complete development of the system once a desired
effect, forecasted by the systems study, had taken place.
The military tactician would call this tactic a feint. The
effectiveness of military feints can be measured by the
amount of enemy men and material committed to counter them.
This particular notion and its use in systems analysis has
great potential, but again rests on a greater understanding
23 Hitch, C. J., Decision-Making for Defense (University
of California Press, 1965), p. 75.
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of threat as this country and its potential adversaries
perceive it
.
The purpose of this general discussion has been to
uncover some functional relationships that give insight into
threat assessment. (The structure of the problem of threat
assessment is discussed in Section V.) This insight was
intended to be accomplished by clarification, argument and
explanation of major issues that concern the assessment of
threat carried on today by system analysts.
B. NATIONAL GOALS
National goals and the values of the people of a nation
are exceedingly difficult to define. Historically, it seems
that the task fell to officials to voice these concepts to
the satisfaction of the masses. In the United States men
are elected to offices of great importance by their ability
to voice what people want.
The difficulty that an analyst encounters in his quest
of threat assessment is the relationship between threats and
goals. Goals are constructed from values. A single goal may
be constructed from a single value or an infinite number. A
national goal, the goal that the majority of the people of a
nation feel should be accomplished, therefore is made up from
the many values possessed by this majority.
If national survival or the continuance of the culture,
traditions and ideology of a nation is a national goal and
if this goal is threatened by another nation tremendous sums
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in lives, resources and money are paid to protect this goal.
On the other hand, if national survival is not a paramount
national goal and a foreign power threatens the culture,
tradition and ideology of a nation, many times the protection
of these concepts is adopted as a result.
One can see that values do make up goals but threats to
previously unknown goals can motivate a nation's people to
take up these threatened concepts and force their acceptance
as national goals.
By this reasoning national goals embody the values of a
people, or their leaders. Threats to national goals tend to
make nations able to define these goals more clearly or adopt
as national goals those concepts that seem to be threatened.
Why is this discussion presently mired in this sort of
reasoning? It is because if one cannot somehow relate to
analysts what the nation's goals are, it is exceedingly dif-
ficult for the analyst to accurately assess the threats to
these goals. Further insight into the problem of national
goals finds that analysts not only need to know what the
goals of a nation are, but to what extent they are valued in
relation to each other. If this is not known and the assump-
tion is made that they are equally valuable then misallocation
of resources to accomplish national goals result. For example
if the United States valued in a similar manner national sur-
vival and environmental cleanup, it would spend equal money,
time and effort on them. (This example implicitly uses
values as the mechanism to relate resources to goals.)
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It is important that analysts find some mechanism that
attributes values to goals (once national goals are defined)
and the amount of threat to the most highly valued goals .
This process will allow allocation of resources to protect
these goals. This mechanism will help to solve the problem
if it is remembered that defining national goals should be
the starting point.
Contemporary scientists inherit tremendous aversion to
the process of making value judgments or deciding what the
people ought to value. If scientists concern themselves with
what people actually do value, there is no conflict. If
this can be done, it will lend tremendous insight into the
creation of national goals. With these goals as a starting
point, concentration of effort on assessing the threat to
these goals can be accomplished.
Whether any of the concepts in the preceding discussion
will be accomplished depends on future efforts to tackle
these concepts. It is safe to say that the goals we value
as a nation have yet to be determined. The threat to these
goals is dependent on recognition of our goals.
An analyst who does not recognize the infra-structure of
the problem of threat assessment and does not agonize over
his assumptions concerning this infra-structure will be prone
to think he has truly solved a problem, when in fact he has
only compounded it by possible misallocation of resources or
in any event, allocation of resources to personally ascribed
goals assumed to be national goals.
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C. MEASURES
In any discussion of scientific methodologies and their
logic, necessarily one must discuss measurement. In systems
analysis measurement plays an important role as it does in
all scientific activity. Yet there exists no theory of
measurement to guide practitioners. In fact, controversy
centers over how measurements are made and their effect on
the results of a given study. This controversy over measure-
ment affects acceptance of a study and therefore, implementa-
tion of its recommendations.
The controversy over measurements prompts much of this
investigation. For how can one measure such an ill-defined
and complex concept as threat in such a situation? In this
context, it was appropriate to discuss only the possible
structure of measures of threat
.
As a starting point, the establishment of the dimension-
ality of measurement of threat should be made. Scales (i.e.,
ordinal, cardinal, interval, nominal) for each dimension will
determine the sort of mathematical operations that can be
performed and to some extent the amount of information con-
tained in each measurement of each dimension.
Once the dimensions (areas of interest) of the concept of
threat are determined, the division into subregions of inter-
est of the dimensions must be determined. After the concept
of threat is refined to the point of understanding by dimen-
sioning each dimension of interest one can visualize the
interrelated concepts that characterize threat. A matrix
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of m x n dimensions can be used for discussion. The m
represents the number of initial characterizations of threat.
The n represents the possible number of characterizations of
each dimension. Now each element in this matrix can be
another matrix of m x n and so on. For example, a potential
enemy's threat to this country can be divided into three
categories: economic, cultural and military. These cate-
gories can further be divided. For example, the economic
threat can be divided into several more categories such as
foreign trade, effect on world markets, etc. The foreign
trade category can be further characterized by tons of goods
exported, tons of goods imported, tariff barriers, and so on.
The measures of the basic elements of these last matrices
can be relatively simple. The question is now whether these
basic measures can be related theoretically to the original
matrix that was decomposed. The point of this example is
that until a generally accepted theory of decomposing threat
into basic , measurable concepts is accomplished one is reduced
to assumptions and scenarios and other scientifically crude
methods. (This point will be taken up later.) The intent is
not to imply that these methods are wrong or less right than
future scientific methods of measurement of threat. The intent
is to state that they are not reproducible, that is, each is
researcher-dependent. The extent to which one man using an-
other man's methods achieves the same result determines the
value of the method. (This country has deeply felt the loss
of astute political scientists and diplomats over and over
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again when less accomplished individuals tried to interpret
world events. This loss was felt because the method of
these men could not be used by other men to accomplish
similar results.)
This discussion is not meant to imply that the quantifi-
cation of threat lies in counting missiles or tons of ship-
ping or whatever, although the quantification may well be
contained in such an accounting. What is the intent here is
to emphasize that the careful documented construction of a
theory of measurement of threat is a requirement to any study
that bases its results on the quantification of threat. What
to be measured and in what manner is not, and can never be
assumed to be a simple task.
D. RESOURCES
Before the advent of systems analysis and the planning,
programming and budgeting management tool in the Defense
Department, the President usually informed his Defense
Secretaries of the amount of money intended for each depart-
ment. The respective departments then maximized defense with
respect to this budget ceiling. Now without arbitrary ceil-
ings to limit the budget required for defense, the Defense
Department attempts to support political objectives in an
optimum manner.
24 McNamara, R. S., "The Formulation of Political
Objectives and Their Impact on the Budget," A Modern Design
for Defense Decision (Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
1956), pp. 27-29.
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The past discussion of measures and their importance
was motivated by the fact that as a nation we are limited in
the resources used in national defense. Resources such as
manpower, natural resources and mental resources (the nation's
will to accomplish a task, educated personnel able to perform
complex functions or cope with complex problems and situa-
tions) are limited. The manner in which they are allocated
helps construct the fabric of a nation's existence. If a
nation emphasizes the manufacture of war materials it cannot
produce as many consumer goods that require the same type of
resources. If this country fails or is in error in its
assessment of threat in relation to its national goals, the
misallocation can be costly indeed in terms of the national
resources
.
The need to determine the magnitude of the error in
threat assessment points up the need for a bench mark or
index of defense level. Otherwise, the calculation of threat
can be of no use in allocation. In the past, the tendency
has been to plan to defend every possible imagined contin-
gency given a budget ceiling. With possible threats ranging
from future Viet Nams to sophisticated submarine-launched-
multiple-warhead missiles, the defense against this total
spectrum is too expensive without an index of defense level,
say in terms of national resources.
The nation is faced with the problems confronting all
modern, highly advanced industrial states such as environmen-
tal pollution, urban transportation, urban renewal, population
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control and education. The defense of the nation must
compete with these other areas that require the same re-
sources. Could one reduce the spectrum of actual threats
to this nation one could increase the spectrum of internal
problem areas attacked with the resources that were destined
for defense. At this time, no way exists to narrow the
spectrum of threats perceived by this country. Indeed, no
method exists to compute the cost in resources to this nation
in defense against a single weapons system arrayed against it
.
Could this cost in resources be computed, it might prove to
be too high. The nation might reconsider defending against
that particular weapons system, or at least, the nation's
defense planners might consider if the system were ever going
to actually be used against this nation. In any case, an
25
open-ended budgeting process based on inexact allocation
methods should not be tolerated in an environment containing
limited resources.
E. DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY DETERMINATION
Alain Enthoven stated:
Do judgment and experience have no place in this
approach to the choice of weapon systems and strategy
and design of the defense program? Quite the contrary.
The suggestion that the issue is judgment versus
computers is a red herring. Ultimately all policies
are made and all weapon systems are chosen on the basis
of judgments. There is no other way and there never
will be. The question is whether those judgments have
to be made in the fog of inadequate and inaccurate data,
25 Ibid.
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unclear and undefined issues, and a welter of
conflicting personal opinions, or whether they can
be made on the basis of adequate, reliable informa-
tion, relevant experience, and clearly drawn issues.
The point is to render unto computers the things that
are computers' and to judgment the things that are
judgment's. In the end, there is no question that
analysis is but an aid to judgment and that, as in the
case of God and Caesar, judgment is supreme. 26
One must submit that the decision to "render unto computers
the things that are computers'" is as important a decision-
making activity as the decisions about the selection of
strategies and weapons systems that are based on output from
computers
.
One may define the analysts' contribution in the defense
establishment as improving the perspective of decision-makers
and increasing their ability to react to changes in the
environment in which they function. If analysts are thought
of as decision-makers setting policies concerning their ap-
proach to scientific activity, the perspective they present
to decision-makers is biased by the analysts' research deci-
sions. It is accepted that the decision made by an individual
who has been assisted by analysis is better in some sense than
the decision made about the same situation without the benefit
of analysis. It is probably clear that the method by which
one acquires his information determines its value.
Acceptance of the criterion of having the maximum amount
of information about a problem or situation leads one to
Enthoven, A. C, "Choosing Strategies and Selecting
Weapon Systems," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (The
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966), pp. P+3-144.
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naturally select decisions made with more information as
better. Modern day Defense Department policy-makers depend
on quality information. An efficient sorting and filtering
of information into useful form is required. This is where
systems analysts use their scientific approach and mathemat-
ical tools and their own decision processes. Thus, defense
management has decided that some of the most valuable informa-
tion is that produced by systems analysis. Furthermore, this
decision was prompted because of the method whereby analysts
go about their analysis.
What is the point? It is this: a method that allows
its practitioners to make faulty decisions in its practice
is not valuable. A study based on a threat assessment that
is faulty deteriorates the quality of the decision or policy
based on the study.
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V. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. GENERAL
"One should know one's enemies, their alliances, their
resources and the nature of their country in order to plan
2 7
a campaign." So said Frederick the Great in 1747. The
problem of assessing the threat of one's enemies certainly
isn't new. In Frederick's time armies were formed to be
used. Once one discovered that one's enemy had an army he
could be sure that war would follow. Only the time and place
of the initiation of warfare needed estimation.
Today threat assessment is complicated by the fact that
most countries have standing armed forces. Many of these
forces are equipped with weapons of awesome destructive power
and have the ability to employ them within minutes. The cost
of defense is related to how much threat one's enemies present
and how much threat is desired to present to them.
In this age possessing weapons does not imply their use.
The decision to use military power might then be construed to
be threat. But if military power has no ability to prevent
one from accomplishing one's goals it may not be threatening.
Dissertations concerning what threat ij3_ and i_s_ not are
usually constructs of the writer's imagination. Arguments
such as:
27 Frederick the Great, Instructions for His Generals
,
trans. BGen R. R. Phillips (Stackpole Co., I960), p. 24.
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Let us realize that the threat itself represents
the culmination of a decision analysis by the "opponent".
From an innumerable set of variables, certain values
have been extracted and collated in the specific
threat. The threat is then the opponent's value repre-
sentation of the interrelated decision processes of the
threatened and the threatener . 28
are clever and seemingly correct. What is never clear in
these arguments is how one arrives at such exact definitions
and explanations of threat. If there in fact exists no method
other than a self-survey of what a particular observer feels
about how threat should be defined, systems analysts must be
able to value these feelings in order to base analyses on
them. At present the ability to value is not operational in
the sense that the valuing process is reproducible.
The inputs to the Defense Department can be characterized
as coming from various intelligence agencies, the State De-
partment, the National Security Council, the President and
Congress. The outputs from the Defense Department can be
called national defense and characterized by programs, pol-
icies and plans supported by the defense budget. The problem
of tracing any one input throughout the entire defense estab-
lishment and then noting its effect on the various outputs
is staggering. (It may be that once this is accomplished,
the action that the defense establishment takes on its various
inputs would constitute the starting point whereby scientific
? 8
Thompson, W. P., The Treatment of Subjective Factors
in Threat Analysis (unpublished Master's thesis, The United
States Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 1961), p. 29.
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analysis of threat assessment could begin. Or ideally, these
actions may be sufficient and the problem of assessing threat
has in fact been accomplished.) Alain Enthoven described why
the process of tracing any single input would be difficult in
1962:
To the extent that major national security policy
problems are quantitative in character, calculations
are relevant. Of course, there are many things that
simply cannot be calculated; for example, the relia-
bility of an ally, or the psychological and political
consequences of a military operation. And these non-
quantitative factors may dominate the problem. But
there are also many things that cannot be done intui-
tively or based entirely on experience. Intuition
and experience unaided by calculations will not tell
us how many ICBM's are needed to destroy a target
system, nor will they tell us how many C-l4l's are
required to move a division. For most of these
questions, a mix of calculations, intuition, and
experience is required. One of the biggest challenges
facing us today is how to find ways of blending these
factors better in those areas in which unaided calcula-
tion is weakest. 29
This system description is crude but of sufficient detail to
adequately describe what goes on today in the Defense Depart-
ment concerning the assessment of threat. Because no manner
exists to value these assessments scientifically, the error
involved in this process is unknown. No presently reproduc-
ible method of threat assessment exists, what does exist are
ever changing methods used without benefit of a theory or
even crude operational theorems . The methods used are the
preference of individual decision-makers and analysts.
29 Enthoven, A. C, "Operations Research at the National
Policy Level," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (The
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966)', p. 158.
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Since analysts are faced with developmental problems
when dealing with assessment of threat it seems plausible
that a thorough knowledge of the history of epistemology and
the theory of knowledge would be part of their interests. It
is not so in general. Professional philosophers on the other
hand, possess the knowledge of these subjects but know little
of present day science. Consequently, the attempts at
construction of theories and/or methods by analysts often
times fail to include the results of past methodological
inquiries. This lack of rigor confounds the problem of
assessing threat with that of theory construction. Could
this breach be narrowed by both philosophers and analysts
much progress could be made in just the establishment of a
method of communications between these two diverse professions
The various inputs that the Defense Department received
when characterized as a system present a problem to analysts.
For example, if an analyst receives an assessment of the
Middle East situation from the State Department couched in
their own unique jargon, it would be extremely difficult for
the analyst to re-examine this assessment, select and value
the pertinent variables relating to his analysis without
specific knowledge of how the appraisal was made. Implicitly,
the State Department values its information. This valuation
is not reproducible in a scientific sense either. Faced with




this dilemma the analyst usually uses his own "mix of
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calculations, intuition, and experience as required.
Whether this "mix" has a debilitory effect on the original
State Department assessment is unknown. In light of this
example, the need for a method of valuation of inputs to
defense analysts is confounded with the problem of threat
assessment by these same analysts. Obviously, much of threat
evaluation lies in working with present inputs to Defense
Department channels (possibly all threat may be assessed by
using present inputs) but until a systems analyst truly under-
stands what an Under-Consul in Haifa meant by "awesome ability
to conduct war," for example, one must assume the analyst
will impart his own particular interpretation to this phrase.
B. THE LACK OP A GENERAL THEORY
The problem of choosing strategies and weapon
systems is a unique problem requiring a method of
its own. It is obviously not Physics or Engineering
or Mathematics or Psychology or Diplomacy or Economics,
nor is it entirely a problem in military operations
though it involves elements of all of the above.
Because it involves a synthesis of the above-mentioned
disciplines and others, it requires the cooperation of
experts in all of these professions and many others.
It is a not infrequent error, made by civilians and
military alike, to identify defense planning uniquely
with one of the above professions or disciplines . 33
32J Enthoven, A. C, "Operations Research at the National
Policy Level," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (The
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966 ) , p . T58.
33 Enthoven, A. C, "Choosing Strategies and Selecting
Weapon Systems," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (The
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966 ) , p . 138
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It is not easy to tell someone how to carry out
a systems analysis. We lack an adequate theory to
guide us. This must be expected, for systems
analysis is a fairly new discipline, and history
teaches us that good theory usually comes late in
the development of any field and after many false
starts. Where the attention of systems analysis
has turned to methods, it has focused mainly on
the development of mathematical techniques for
handling certain specialized problems, common in
the practice of operations research-rather than on
building a basic theory for the treatment of the
broad questions typical in defense planning . . .
The more important philosophical problems . . .
such as occur in providing assurance that the model
is meaningful, in devising schemes to compensate for
uncertainty, or in choosing appropriate measures of
effectiveness, still remain troublesome . 3^
The result of the installation of systems analysis at the
National Policy Level in the early sixties has been to assume
in many cases that the application of methods used by indi-
vidual analysts were valid because of the operational nature
of the Defense Department. Systems analysis as a discipline
in relation to the development of an adequate theory is like
a leaky boat at sea. The boat needs dry docking and re-
caulking but it still needs to carry out its mission. Pump-
ing and underway repair go on at sea without a course change
to a repair facility. Systems analysis is in use today. It
produces answers that are in need of a theoretical back-up.
The assessment of threat is an important step in this theory
development because once a threat estimate is made the re-
mainder of the analysis is built upon this foundation. A
contention of this paper is that a recursive theory-building
process should start with the assessment of threat. Once




this assessment problem has been resolved the construction
of an adequate systems analysis theory might follow.
C. THE ROLE DISORIENTATION OF ANALYSTS
The question of what discipline or what group should
properly address the problem of threat assessment is moot.
This deprivation of practical significance of this question
comes because the construction of a method should precede
the assignment of the method to a discipline. But yet the
construction of a method to accomplish something is biased
from what perspective the construction takes place.
Political scientists may already claim the ability to
assess threat yet their method cannot be used by systems
analysts not knowledgeable of their discipline. Methods con-
structed by a particular discipline usually are constructed
for use by members of the peculiar discipline. (At least
historically this has been the case. A case in point is
mathematics. Mathematical techniques that were obscure five
hundred years ago have recently found use in other disciplines.
The disciplines involved usually had gained enough mathematical
rigor over the years for proper communication with mathematics.)
Since systems analysis as a discipline is relatively new
and has developed from other considerably advanced disci-
plines (Mathematics, Mathematical Economics, Engineering and
Physics, to name a few) the channels of communication to less
advanced, less rigorous disciplines in the behavioral-social-
political complex of disciplines are few. This causes the
typical systems analyst to endeavor to make these disciplines
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fit into his particular schemata of analysis. Oftentimes
this results in misstatements about the exceedingly complex
structures which make up the phenomena with which these
social sciences deal. With these oversimplified problem
statements as a foundation systems analysts build up their
own exceedingly complex scientific analysis until one must
question the value of the analysis. [See Green, Ref. 7].
The crux of the problem here is what this paper terms
role disorientation . Because the analyst is asked by
decision-makers to deal with problems that in the past were
nominally dealt with by social disciplines, the analyst at-
tempts to answer these questions. The result is oftentimes
catastrophic. Not only does the analyst embroil himself in
areas of other disciplines where he may not be well versed,
but he may present such well ordered, logical and complete
arguments considering his assumptions that the decision-maker
is forced to arrive at the analyst's conclusion also. In
other words, by his clean -breast technique of dealing with
normally complex phenomena the analyst assumes the role of
the decision-maker or policy-maker. (Scenarios play an
important part in these predictive arguments and are probably
the worst methods used by analysts in light of over-
simplification.)
Measurement plays an important part also in the further-
ance of role disorientation. The evolvement of Systems
Analysis included inputs from Industrial Engineering, Opera-
tions Research, Economics and Physics among others. If one
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accepts the observation in relation to measurement that
physical scientists at one end of the spectrum are concerned
with problems of measurement arising from accepted models,
and if one accepts also that social scientists at the other
end are concerned with problems of measurement arising from
proposed empirical studies it follows that systems anal-
ysts can be concerned with the complete spectrum. With no
general theory of measurement to guide all scientific effort,
it is plausible that the measurement schemes used by the
physical scientists and behavioral scientists would be of
interest to systems analysts. The import of the discussion
is that analysts construct their own methods of measurement
without consulting other theorists with similar problems.
The lack of effort that the discipline of systems anal-
ysis puts forth in the assessment of threat may be due to
its members' basic acceptance that the measurement of threat
is impossible in a manner suitable for analytic studies.
Questions of whether the discipline is organized to carefully
construct an accurate and relatively precise method of threat
measurement are answered in the negative. This seems to
allow oversimplification of the complex phenomena of threat.
It is assumed that the structure or its functional relation
cannot be outlined. This is again role disorientation,
because the organization of systems analysis is based on the
Churchman, C. W. and Ratoosh, P. (ed.), Measurement
Definitions and Theories (John Wiley & Sons, Inc . , 1959) >
p . vi .
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claim of considering a problem in relation to other inter-
acting areas considering spillovers and the construction of
theoretical bases to adequately describe or predict the
problem solution. One must submit that the organization of
the discipline is eminently suitable for going about threat
assessment, but it should not go about this task in relation
to a single study. The fundamental effort needs to be in
construction of a general method such that individuals can
then tailor the results of the application of the basic
theory to his own needs. Ideally, one should practice
systems analysis by applying the methods of other disciplines
instead of constructing new methods of analysis. Certainly,
one practices without tampering with the theories on which
the methods are based. Yet as previously discussed over-
simplification of theoretical bases results when systems
analysts attempt reinterpretation of other disciplines'
methods of dealing with threat.
D. VALUE JUDGMENTS
National Defense Policy is generated by the interaction
of value judgments and the costs of military forces and
weapons systems. That these judgments are recognized as
part of the nature of systems analysis is not clear. Pref-
erence for standing back and pointing out to decision-
makers the results of their analysis is the image of systems
of.
Enthoven, A. C, "Operations Research at the National
Policy Level," A Modern Design for Defense Decision (Indus-
trial College of the Armed Forces, 1966 ) , pp . 155-156
.
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analysts; when in fact, the analysts Implicitly value
variables in models by singling them out of problem situa-
tions. This sort of valuation by analysts during threat
analyses may cause an opponent to be much more threatened
than he actually is or vice versa. What is pointed out here
is the importance of determining the actual threat. In the
interim, explanation as to how one values must be included
in analyses with other assumptions. Otherwise decision-
makers will assume a particular analyst's value system to be
valid when actually it may be fallacious or incapable of
selecting an accurate estimation of the situation. In this
case it must be the decision-maker's prerogative to set the
level of threat for particular analyses.
Analysts presently do not involve themselves with spe-
cific statements about value and its relation to threat. It
is exceedingly difficult to formulate National Policy with-
out counting arms, men, systems and dollars, i.e., using the
relevant numbers but it is senseless to manipulate these
numbers analytically without proper qualifications of why
they need manipulation. Until someone qualifies why one
should endeavor to undertake an analysis, the finished anal-
ysis can never be optimal in any sense. For a study to be
optimal one must have something to optimize. In this paper,
the something can be termed "optimizing how the defense
37 Ibid.
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establishment handles the National Security after finding
what level of threat it faces to secure against." Present
studies seem to optimize handling of National Security given
a level of threat. If threat is continuous this implies an
infinity of possible optimal solutions.
Emphasis on what valuations took place in a study imply
no consideration of variables not included in the study.
This sort of method implicitly places zero value on the pos-
sible variables that were not included. In the ethereal
world of threat the setting down of the valuations one makes
subconsciously is impossible. The exhaustive listing of the
conscious decision process is not that difficult. The
partial listing is less arduous. A study should attempt to
take up this task to prevent basing a scientific effort on an
unspecified foundation.
E. THE TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION PROBLEM
Much of this paper has been concerned with the lack of
a sufficient method to quantify threat. There exists methods
that attempt the assessment of threat. (See Section VI)
They suffer from a common factor. The methods do not embody
a complete-enough translation of the concept of threat.
The people of the United States deal with a concept of
threat that is different than the one with which their Gov-
ernment labors. The problem that rears-up is that of anal-
ytical translation and interpretation of individual concepts
for use in an analytical context. For if a study does not
conceptualize threat in a manner that accounts for the
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various concepts that these individuals characterize one
cannot visualize the optimum provision of the common defense
against these felt threats.
The natural question following is, how does one know that
these individuals really know what the threat is? The retort
is that this source supplies the budget that supports the
defense effort. The job of defense as this paper sets forth
is either measure the threat or quantify what is felt by
those individuals supporting the defense establishment.
To make the translation problem clearer an example is
used. Prior to the present abilities to plot the courses of
tropical storms or hurricanes the best defense against them
was to cause whole sections of the coast thought to be threat'
ened to dig in, board up, and so forth. If the anxiety,
shovels, ulcer pills and other sundry items used, could have
been costed, one feels that the amount would have been tre-
mendous. This cost stilled the fears (or perceived threats)
of the individuals involved. Once the actual threat could be
calculated by weather satellites and aircraft the cost was
hopefully cut. Presently, defense analysts possess no meth-
ods to quantify threat and they endeavor to calm their own
fears, not the fears of the threatened people of the United
States
.
This problem is not just inherent in the relationship
between the taxpayers of the Nation and analysts. More
importantly to the analyst it exists between himself and the
decision-maker he serves. Possessing no adequate method to
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handle threat, the analyst usually turns toward what his
decision-maker perceives. Then he must translate this per-
ception into understandable terms to proceed with the study.
The question again arises as to the validity of the decision-
maker's perception of threat.
This translation problem is a deceptively simple concept
but exceedingly difficult to resolve. To resolve this prob-
lem can be no more difficult than the resolution of the
threat assessment problem, and intuitively much less fruit-
ful. The translation problem disappears once threat assess-
ment is accomplished.
F. INTERFACE PROBLEM
One of the maxims of the conduct of systems analysis is
the extreme importance of the analyst interfacing with his
decision-maker. This interface action cannot be properly
accomplished with a staff or a directive. Yet one can dare-
say that singling out ten important decision-makers at the
level of National Defense, that is the level of the National
Security Council, that these men never personally espouse
their ideas of perceived threat to analysts in the Department
of Defense. Yet analysts using policy directives must trans-
late this guidance without benefit of a give-and-take dis-
cussion. One may argue that this interface is not practical
at this level, that these men are too busy. The answer is
then, restate how systems analysts must operate at this level,
The decision-maker acting on a study today is not allowed the
knowledge that the study is a translation, a personal one
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peculiar to the systems analyst that constructed it, and the
study cannot reflect the personal perspectives of the
decision-maker.
The development of a method of practical interfacing of
analysts and appropriate decision-makers is paramount to the
solution of proper threat assessment. It cannot be perceived
that a method of quantifying threat can be accomplished with-
out intimate access to the decision process.
G. SCENARIOS: THE ASSUMPTION OF THREAT
The classic vehicle for systems studies is the scenario.
It appears that the phrase, "Now this is a scenario
. . .
," can be found to be variously applied to
An outline of a sequence of hypothetical
events
;
A record of the actions and counteractions
taken by parties to a conflict;
A plan of actions to be taken during a
projected exercise or maneuver;
The estimate of the situation by Commander
"X" at time "Y" in a war or war game;
A specific set of parametric values selected
for a given run of the computer.
How, then, can we proceed to talk about "scenarios"
without excluding someone's notion of what scenarios
really are?
If we dwell for a moment on these various notions,
we do find a common thread. They all refer to des-
criptions of the conditions under which the systems
they are analyzing, designing, or operating are assumed
to be performing. The system may be a weapon, it may
be a component of a weapon, it may be a vast complex of
weapons and support facilities (such as NORAD) , it may
be an organization (such as the National Military
Command and Control System) , it may even be the entire
national security establishment. Whatever the scope
and properties of the specific system, a scenario-in
systems analysis-can be defined as a statement of
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assumptions about the operating environment of the
particular system we are analyzing. 38
Creation of a scenario (for general nuclear war)
is one of the most difficult aspects of systems anal-
ysis, and calls for great imagination on the part of
those concerned with predicting how a system may be
used at some future time. The analyst obtains informa-
tion regarding possible scenarios by discussing such
possibilities with different decision-makers and
operational personnel, each of whom may have one or
more environmental situations in mind. Thus, there
will probably be no uniform agreement on any one
scenario, and the analyst may be forced to deal with
a wide range of possibilities. Incidentally, this is
a common problem which the analyst also must face in
gathering data which involves the intuitive judgment
of others. . . . the analyst copes with these uncer-
tainties, particularly in the early phases of the
analysis, by making explicit all data and information
he uncovers including contradictory opinions. 39
(Parentheses and underscore mine)
The scenario drives the analysis effort. The scenario
is a method whereby analysts detour around the problem of
threat measurement. Precise statements using "great imagi-
nation" neatly sidestep the problem. If a decision-maker did
not agree with a particular scenario the study was a failure.
More importantly, if the scenario did not parallel reality the
study was a failure.
A scenario is a highly complex series of assumptions
about the future with no theory of scenario construction with
which to guide its writer. Scenarios are assumed levels of
Brown, S., "Scenarios in Systems Analysis," Systems
Analysis and Policy Planning (American Elsevier Publishing
Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 299-300.




threat. Analysts allow optimum solutions to be generated
in relation to these levels. For every level of threat (or
scenario) one has an optimum solution.
Present state of the art considerations dictate the use
of scenarios. These imaginative schemata of the future could




The estimation of threat concerns one with an area that
has fascinated man in the past and still does today. It is
the prediction of future reality. There are many predictive
problems that have been solved at least to the extent that
mankind can derive useful information from the answers.
Tides come in and out on schedule and the moon moves as pre-
dicted allowing the United States to place men on it. The
basic structures of myriad predictive phenomena are well
understood today. Reality can be defined as the total envi-
ronment, perceived or not, of man. (Because a man does not
know a nail awaits his tire on the road ahead, does not dis-
allow the man from having to cope with the flat tire.)
Future reality is this same environment after a passage of
time. Analysts are not concerned with the effectiveness of
weapons systems or policy decision in post hoc operational
analysis. They are concerned with future effectiveness of a
system or policy in a future reality.
Presently, a five year lead times for system development
are common. Policy decisions depend on capabilities on hand
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and anticipated. Systems whose development start today may
influence policy five years hence. Policies today may mod-
ify systems tomorrow. These interactions plus present and
future threats, dictate the nature of the problem with which
analysts must work.
The ability to quantify threat today without development
of methods to push these quantifications into the future will
invalidate studies that are not related to future time peri-
ods. A particular analysis that is absolutely correct in one
time period may be entirely wrong in another.
The ability of individuals to objectively predict future
threats without confounding these future predictions with
present reality is exemplified in history. The generals at
Verdun misinterpreted, to the tune of a million casualties,
the deadliness of barbed wire obstacles covered by rapid-
firing machine guns, the battleship admirals never dreamed
of aircraft sinking capital ships, and the French at Dien
Bien Phu knew that the Viet Mihn could not employ artillery
on a mountain side. History suggests that a temporal thresh-
old exists with regard to threats, weapons systems and
policies. The temporal thresholds for threat predictions,




The ability to assess threat can be valued by examining
what difference a potential ability to accurately assess
threat would make in the defense establishment. If one could
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accurately assess threat it seems plausible that systems
could be built in a more specialized manner rather than with
multiple capabilities. Policy pronouncements could take on
special meaning instead of being couched in phrasing that
is very general and difficult to interpret. The potential
savings in time, effort and resources by precise threat
assessment should be substantial. Presently, by necessity,
the Defense Department must pronounce general policies, con-
struct far-ranging programs and develop systems with multiple
capabilities to counter vaguely perceived complex threats.
This status quo results in cost in resources.
J. DEPENDENCY ASPECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THREAT
The uncertainty associated with threat can be dependent
on several aspects. Two of these aspects can be termed the
knowledge or facts that are presently known and the risk of
delaying to obtain more information.
Suppose for example, one could associate an uncertainty
range to the threat imputed to a United States policy A.
Assume also that the knowledge one has concerning policy A
has an uncertainty range associated with it. It is plausible
to assume that there exists an uncertainty range concerning
the risk of delay to find out more knowledge about policy A.
Suppose further that policies B, C, D, and E also somehow
affect policy A. Policies B, C, D and E may be policies of
the United States, its allies, its enemies or a mix of all
three. Suppose also that there is a range of uncertainty
associated with the knowledge one has about B, C, D and E
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and the risk of delay to find out more knowledge about these
policies. One could go on about weapons systems both
friendly and enemy that affect policy A and describe the
ranges of uncertainties that affect the knowledge and the
risk of delay in acquiring knowledge of these weapons sys-
tems. It will be assumed here that weapons systems X, Y and
Z_ somehow affect policy A. It suffices to say that the
uncertainty range of the threat associated with policy A is
dependent on the knowledges, risks and uncertainty ranges of
the knowledges and risks of not only policy A, but policies
B, C_, D and E and weapons systems X, Y and Z_.
It seems from the past example that a threat uncertainty
range associated with a particular type conception is pos-
sibly dependent on a whole host of other uncertainty ranges .
In the simple discussion above only two aspects of uncertainty
associated with policy A were assumed (knowledge and risk of
delay in acquiring knowledge). There were only two different
dimensions (policies and weapons systems) that were assumed
to affect policy A through these aspects. The example gives
one sixteen different uncertainty ranges affecting the threat
uncertainty range associated with policy A.
Given one is concerned with the threat uncertainty range
associated with a concept and that there are m aspects (i.e.,
knowledge and risk) to the uncertainty affecting the concept
and n dimensions (i.e., five policies and three weapons sys-
tems) of these aspects one can consider m n uncertainty
ranges affecting the concept's uncertainty range.
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The dependency aspect of uncertainties probably could
have tremendous potential effect on reducing costs in re-
sources. For example, if one arrives at the conclusion that
threat uncertainty ranges could be constructed (as previously
discussed) these ranges should probably be related to units
of cost to be useful.
If policy A's threat uncertainty range (in cost units)
depends on m n other threat uncertainty ranges (in cost units)
it seems that a narrowing of these ranges affecting policy A
would reduce the range of uncertainty associated with policy
A, thereby reducing costs. If one reduced all ranges to
points , it seems plausible that the threat uncertainty range
of policy A would either be reduced to a single point or to
its minimum range and therefore its minimum cost.
It is clear that uncertainty costs. At this time, it is
not clear how much it costs because the implied functional
relationships previously discussed have not been discovered
(although most analysts suspect their existence).
K. FIXED UNCERTAINTIES-SCENARIOS
A scenario (see footnote 38) as traditionally used by
systems analysts implicitly fixes threat uncertainty ranges.
That is (reference to the example of Section J. above) given
m n threat uncertainty ranges affecting a concept and the
concept's associated uncertainty of threat are characterized
utilizing a scenario, one must necessarily fix the m n un-
certainty ranges affecting the concept one is interested in
investigating.
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A scenario has the advantage of allowing analysts to
handle threat. For the purposes of this paper the use of
scenarios is disregarded due to their inability to handle the
dependency aspects of uncertainty ranges associated with
threat. Scenarios allow these variables' values to be se-
lected in a manner that places no confidence in them other
than the confidence one has in the analyst who makes the
assumptions. In other words, whatever the scope and prop-
erties of a particular system or policy, a scenario-in
systems analysis-can be defined as a statement of assumptions
40
about the operating environment of the system or policy.
A scenario, while being a useful first approximation,
depending on the imagination of the scenario creator, has no
method whereby confidence levels or probabilistic statements
can be associated to it in a scientific manner. If one agrees
with or likes a particular scenario one goes along with the
analysis based on the scenario. If one does not agree with
the state of the world as perceived by the scenario writer,
the study is invalid.
L. TIME VARIABLE SCENARIOS
Some scenarios utilize what economists call state para -
meters . That is, once a particular range of uncertainty is
selected and optimum procedures conducted in analysis, the
investigator then varies the range of uncertainty arbitrarily.
40 See footnote 38.
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The parameterization of state variables (uncertainty ranges
associated with threat) assumes a particular relationship
between the uncertainty ranges of the variables that affect
the particular state parameter.
When analysts endeavor to make scenarios time-dependent
by variation of uncertainty ranges of threat they make un-
known assumptions about the variables on which these ranges
depend.
Further and deeper dissection of the nature of threat and
the ranges of uncertainty one is able to associate with
threat needs to be accomplished. At present the problems of
uncertainty cannot be handled over time because scientists as
yet have not determined how the functionals discussed in
Section J. should be formulated (if they exist at all). One
is now able to complete a systems study given a specific
threat (i.e., a scenario). But once threats have uncertainty
ranges associated with them, multiple optima can be associated
with the ranges. These multiple optima dictate large multi-
purpose systems and general, all encompassing, policy formu-
lations which cost in resources.
M. RECOGNITION OP UNCERTAINTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THREAT.
Rudwick tells the reader in his book:
Analyzing competitive uncertainties. Here the
key question to be addressed is, "What are the various
strategies and tactics that the competitor (enemy) can
employ, at what strength, and what impact will these
have upon the effectiveness of each of the system
alternatives being analyzed?" Perhaps the most impor-
tant aspect of dealing with competitive uncertainty is
recognizing that it is an important problem. This may
seem obvious, but many systems analyses and systems
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planning efforts are deficient because it is assumed
that the competitor will act in only one assumed way.^1
The recognition problem associated with threat uncertainties
is fundamentally more complex than Rudwick lets on and cannot
be simply handled by "recognizing that it is an important
42problem.
"
The recognition problem is not only concerned with what
an enemy can and will do with his various assets; more fun-
damental and important, it is also concerned with the ability
to continue to recognize the change in an enemy's threat
attitude toward us once we as a nation attempt to counter or
neutralize an enemy threat.
This ability is not accomplished as Rudwick states by
assumption. As this paper points out this ability cannot be
accomplished by scientific method at present. The social
sciences make much of their ability to observe and predict,
but until their results can be stated in a meaningful manner,
understood by system analysts, the recognition of changing
threats remains "an important problem."
N. PROBABILITY AS AN ADEQUATE CALCULUS OP UNCERTAINTY
ASSOCIATED WITH THREAT .
Today there exists two theories of probability. The
first and most widely used is the probability that is found






in set theory. The second can be said to be constructed from
44psychology or social psychology. This paper terms the
former theory mathematical or set-theoretic probability. The
latter theory is called subjective or qualitative probability,
Mathematical probability or set-theoretic probability
depends on the ordering of some reference class into classes.
Together with the theory of random numbers mathematical
probability provides a method to measure probabilities in
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a standard fashion.
Subjective probability depends on the qualitative judg-
ments of men. That is, probabilities between zero and one
are solicited from men through some method to determine prob-
abilities associated with interesting phenomena. (Usually
those phenomena that cannot be logically related to a set-
theoretic probability measure.)
The clear need for a probability measurement is not
contested here, although the nature of threat is difficult
to determine when related to the probabilities discussed.
The nature of the problem of threat assessment bears out this
observation. Analysts attempt to cope with threats that may
be of a set-theoretic nature in a general historical sense
but not exactly. Some threats may seem unique (that is not
of a class of threats) but can in some manner be related to
44
It is not the intent here to discuss probability
theory for those readers uninitiated with respect to the
calculus of probabilities.




mathematical probability measures and not lie completely in
the realm of subjective probabilities.
If one attempts to associate the statement "there is a
probability of war of .5" to a probability measure, which
measure does one choose? Is the .5 from mathematical proba-
bility worth or valued the same as .5 from a subjective
probability measure? Can one class anticipated war into the
class of past wars? These questions are the prelude to a
most important question. Are present probability measures
adequate calculi to use in threat assessment? Obviously, the
probability associated with the failure of the Bay of Pigs
Invasion is not the same probability associated with the
failure of a missile launch as probabilities are theorized
today. Yet the probabilities that one associates with these
two diverse events probably must be used in the assessment of
threats
.
Present analytic techniques weigh subjective and mathe-
matical probabilistic notions equally. This equal weight
is certainly not bound up in scientific theory. Unless
serious effort is attempted concerning the most feasible
method to use these two diversely developed probability meas-
ures, studies using both measures surely have no meaning.
One must concern himself with whether mathematical prob-
ability can ever convey meaning in decision-making problems
made under conditions of uncertainty. One must also question
the sang-froid statements made by experts predicting out-
comes of complex phenomena relating to threat assessment.
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(One last remark is appropriate. There exists notions
that a probabilistic world is in fact extant, in spite of
mans' inability to perceive it. This notion must be refuted
because it cannot be defended. No manner exists to refute
it. That is as Kant set down in his thesis: facts or data
are not moves of nature; they are in part moves of manking
46forever colored by man's observatory facilities. That is
can mankind understand some concept completely if it is not
the product of mankind himself? This is doubtful.)
0. SUMMARY
Threat assessment is a complex and immensely complicated
problem today. The problem of properly identifying and then
assessing threats to this country is magnified in this era
of standing armies and almost instant communication.
Historically
,
possessing weapons almost invariably has
led to their use. This is passe primarily due to the awesome
destructiveness of modern nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their highly accurate and dependable delivery
systems. It seems that countries cannot afford to withstand
the second strike capabilities of their enemies.
The notion of threat is a primitive one which is partially
understood by all men but definable by none. Today no gen-
erally acceptable definition exists that allows one to attempt
measurement of the concept of threat. In addition, no method
is operational to value predictions about threats present





and/or future, that is operational to the extent that errors
can be detected and associated with threat predictions.
The process whereby present Defense Department analysts
assess threat has not been documented . Research indicates
that if these methods were discovered they would be without
benefit of a theory or operational theorems .
Analysts oftentimes fail to include the results of past
methodological inquiries in their construction of theories
and/or methods. This failure is due in part to the wide
communication s abyss between analysts (knowledgeable of
present day science) and professional philosophers (possessed
of knowledge of the history of epistemology and the theory
of knowledge). This communications problem not only exists
between philosophers and analysts. It is a salient feature
of the relationship between traditional threat assessment
agencies and defense analysts.
Systems analysis is in use today producing answers that
are in need of a theoretical back-up . The assessment of
threat is an important step in this theory development be-
cause once a threat estimate is made the remainder of the
analysis is built upon this foundation.
The analyst attempts to solve problems that were nominal-
ly dealt with by social disciplines in the past simply be-
cause the analyst is asked by decision-makers. Thus, role
disorientation results when the analyst embroils himself in
areas of other disciplines where he oftentimes oversimpli-
fies. Through this oversimplification technique, the analyst
usually handles complex phenomena nicely . So nicely, in
67
fact, that he convinces his decision-maker of the merits of




systems analysis generally has
not benefited from other disciplines with similar problems.
Analysts usually construct their own methods of measurement
without use of previous work in the particular area in
question
.
National defense policy is generated by the interaction
of value j udgments and the costs of military forces and
weapons systems. It is not clearly understood that these
judgments are in part the nature of systems analysis. All
too often analysts shy away from statements of how they value
concepts. Without lucid explanation of how one values to
accompany one's assumptions, decision-makers are denied the
act of assessing the validity of any system of valuation.
Presently rhetoric is generated concerning what is best
for the American people in relation to their defense. The
translation problem associated with what is best for their
defense has not been resolved. Once threat assessment is
accomplished the translation problem will disappear.
High level defense decision-makers must use analyses
without knowledge of how they were constructed because of
inadequate interface with the analysts who serve them. The
decision-maker who acts on a study is not allowed the knowl-
edge that the study is a translation, a personal one peculiar
to the systems analyst who constructed it. Therefore, the
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study cannot reflect the personal perspectives of the
dec! si on-maker because of the lack of interface with the
analyst
.
The classic almost irreplaceable vehicle for systems
studies is the scenario. The scenario drives the analysis
effort. Scenarios are assumed levels of threat . For every
level of threat (different scenario) one has a different
optimal solution.
Today the ability to quantify threat without development
of methods to push these quantifications into the future will
invalidate studies that are not related to future time peri-
ods. Without proper temporal considerations a particular
analysis that is absolutely correct in one time period may be
entirely wrong in another. History suggests that a temporal
threshold exists with regard to threats, weapons systems and
policies. These thresholds have not been investigated.
The defense planner is concerned with uncertainty and
the ability to handle it properly. The dependency aspects of
uncertainty are difficult to perceive. Until it is possible
to perceive how dependency functionals are constructed, un-
certainty will cost. How much uncertainty costs cannot be
presently determined. Scenarios implicitly fix threat uncer-
tainty ranges. For the purposes of this paper the use of
scenarios was disregarded due to their inability to handle
the dependency aspect of uncertainty ranges associated with
threat. The recognition of uncertainty associated with
threat remains a difficult problem. Further investigation
into claims made by the social sciences is merited.
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Probability in both its set-theoretic and subjective
forms is now used in present assessment and each is weighed
the same. Unless serious effort is attempted concerning the
most feasible methods to use these two diversely developed





Section VI of this paper concerns itself with five methods
that attempt or can be used to assess threat. These five
methods do not form an exhaustive list of methods; rather
these methods that exist in relation to threat are represent-
ative of particular philosophic standpoints (or perspectives).
It is anticipated that if a method of threat assessment
could be constructed for use by analysts the method would
draw information from the five perspectives dealt with in
this section. Pour of these five areas merit investigation,
the fifth area is the systems analytic approach.
The purpose of this section is to briefly present a
general outline of four of the methods and make only brief
comments about the fifth method.
A. THE POLITICAL-MILITARY METHOD OR THE METHOD OF ASSUMPTION
AND EXPOSITION
Examples of this sort of method of threat assessment can
be found in many sources. The most noteworthy are found in
The Naval Institute Proceedings
, Brasse ' s Annual , The Army
Magazine
,
The Military Review , Foreign Affairs and The Marine
Corps Gazette . In addition, political-military commentators
of major newspapers and major communications networks prac-
tice this type of method. There are also numerable books
filled with this type of analysis.
The political-military perspective usually takes a
hypothetical aspect of threat and then spins out logical
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consequences from this Impressionistic basis. This method
is rhetorical in that it aims at convincing the listener or
the reader of the author's point of view. The following
examples of this method represent typical political-military
threat assessment methods. (The following examples happen




From an article entitled, "The Defense of the Central
Region of NATO" comes this example:
The Threat . There is a substantial body of opinion
in high-level United States official circles which sug-
gests that NATO has for years been substantially over -
rating the Soviet threat to the Central Region and the
Soviet superiority in conventional forces in particular.
Former Defense Secretary McNamara in a testimony before
Congress tried to point out that assessments of the
Warsaw Pact land-air order of battle were conceived on
far too narrow an analyses. He indicated that a great
many factors, other than purely manpower, had to be taken
into account such as training, equipment, reserve
strengths, etc., before a true assessment could be made.
The McNamara intervention came at the time when the
previous U.S. Administration was working hard to per-
suade European countries to increase significantly their
conventional forces in order to give time for nuclear
decision-making, and that given a reasonable increase
the Soviets could be held by conventional means alone.
Whilst there may be some sense in the McNamara view that
NATO should analyze the Soviet-Warsaw Pact order of
battle more professionally, there is no getting away from
the fact that with the amount of force at the behest of
the Soviets, and accepting they would be the aggressor
,
there is no doubt that they could produce a crushing
superiority of force at a time and place of their own
choosing.
7 Moulton, J. L., Barclay, C. N. and Yooe , W. M. (ed.),
Brassey's Annual The Armed Forces Year-Book 1969 (William
Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 1969).
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There is another aspect of the threat worth consid -
ering
,
and it is that the Warsaw Pact as a whole are
operating Russian equipment-a useful common denominator
when compared to the hotch-potch available to NATO. So
the overall threat remains , regardless of how the fig-
ures are maneuvered. In a speech earlier this year at
Munich, United Kingdom Defense Minister Denis Healey
made the point :
What is clear is that the Warsaw Pact had
advantage in two particular respects so great
as to render doubtful any prospect that NATO
might have of putting up a successful conven-
tional defense for more than a few days.
These advantages are numbers of tanks and
surprise. The Warsaw Pact outnumbers NATO
in tanks by more than two to one in peacetime
and by 2-1/2 to one after mobilization.
This obviously gives them a great advantage , and no
amount of figure-fixing can alter these facts . ^8
(Underscoring mine)
One sees that the author has (through some method of his own,
which he does not discuss) valued "the amount of force at the
behest of the Soviets." This "amount," assuming the Soviets
"would be the aggressor," "would produce a crushing superi-
ority of force." This rhetoric is aimed at rebutting the
expressed views of McNamara. This aim could have been accom-
plished from an analytical point of view had the discussion
pointed up the method used to value the amount of force
possessed by the Soviets and the logic used to assume the
Soviets would be the attacking power.
Prom the same publication one finds a second example from
an article entitled, "NATO's Northern Plank":
Strategic Assessment. In the south, an
aggressor's aim might be to gain control of the
exits from the Baltic and at the same time to
secure the flank of his forces operation in western
continental Europe.
48 Ibid., Bandusiae, "The Defense of the Central Region
of NATO," pp. 4 8-49.
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With a proper command organization in this area,
such as the one which is now firmly established, it
is possible to exploit to the full the defensive
capability of both the German and the Danish forces
available. They are mutually dependent of each other,
and proper coordination has been made possible through
the joint Allied command.
From a military point of view, it does not seem
likely
i
that an attack against any part of this area
could be carried out without involving the forces
of the Central Command . The aggressor would have
to regard the forces of NATO as an entity . If he
attacked the forces in Denmark and/or Schleswig-
holstein, he would have to reckon with these forces
being supported by powerful forces of the Central
Command and must plan accordingly. The defense of
this area cannot, therefore, be considered in isola-
tion, and it would not be correct to measure the
isolated strength of the Northern Command forces in
this area against that of a possible aggressor's
without taking the whole of NATO's strength into
account. ^9 (Underscoring mine)
Again one sees that it is difficult to ferret out the method
or reasoning whereby the author takes his particular stand.
Language such as "an aggressor's aim might be" can be
translated to scientific j argon as "the assumption of this
study is," although there seems to be no datum present to
support this assumption. The selection of what the "aggres-
or's aim" might be is critical to the remaining arguments.
In addition, if one substitutes "prevent control" for "gain
control" in the article the consequences are logically much
different than the author constructed. Lastly, the paragraph
heading "strategic assessment" could do more justice to the
argument if changed to "a possible assessment."
As a last example of this sort of threat assessment an
article entitled, "The Soviet Strategic Offensive and the
NATO Southern Flank" is cited:
^ Ibid . , Koren, C, "NATO's Northern Flank," p. 69.
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There are some who doubt that NATO naval forces
can survive in the eastern Mediterranean and some
who go so far as to believe that survival anywhere
in the Mediterranean will be impossible. There
certainly are real threats which support such
positions .
There is little doubt that the Soviet anti-ship
missile force is intended primarily to attack and
eliminate U.S. aircraft carriers. There is no doubt
that this is a formidable and highly effective force
when operated as an integrated system employing sur-
face ships, land-based aircraft and submarines in
coordinated reconnaissance, surveillance and attack
operations. Sixth Fleet and allied naval power sur-
vival will demand that this missile system be dealt
with quickly and decisively. Past experience indi -
cates that Soviet missile-equipped naval forces will
shadow NATO forces continuously and at close range
under any and all circumstances. Prudence dictates
that the Soviets must learn to understand that this
is a particularly unhealthy occupation for their
missile forces. In times of tension it is reasonable
to consider that close surveillance within effective
missile range by heavily armed naval forces is highly
provocative and will be dealt with accordingly, even
to the point of destroying offending forces if the
general strategic and tactical situation has degen-
erated to the point where open hostility appears to
be imminent. Lacking such resolve, the ability of
our forces in the eastern Mediterranean to survive is
questionable. These statements are not intended to
argue that since survival is questionable the force
shou Id not be exposed,
the western powers
Rather, the intent is to argue
that must maintain a favorable bal-
ance of power not only from the standpoint of quantity
and qual ity but also from the st;andpoint of ' tb.e will to
use the naval power to maintain command of the sea in
the face of any threat within the entire spectrum of
naval warfare . 5u (Underscoring mine)
Again this particular author's phrasing implies that the
threats he discussed are in no way implausible. Further, the





, Ashworth, F., "The Soviet Strategic Offensive
and the NATO Southern Flank," pp. 79-80.
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There are four principle characteristics attached to this
school of threat assessment. First, the author assumes a
particular aspect of threat. He uses this aspect as the
perspective from which he spins out his discourse. Secondly,
he carefully constructs a predictive environment with his
own personal methods. Thirdly, these methods are never fully
explained and usually are not referred to in the assessment
process. The fourth characteristic is a resulting set of
tight and neat arguments designed to convince the reader of
the author's perception of future consequences. Thus, one
has an exposition of the logical (at least from the author's
point of view) consequences that might occur given his
assumed aspect of threat as a basis.
An analyst sees many shortcomings in this sort of assess-
ment when trying to determine how to use it in an analysis.
It is difficult to attach magnitudes. It is also difficult
to value the assessments because of the lack of methodolo-
gical discussions. Finally, it is difficult to use this type
of assessment in a sensitivity analysis because it seems to
be a point estimate of threat level (although this is not
clear)
.
B. PSYCHO-POLITICAL METHOD: THE CASE STUDY APPROACH
The psycho-political philosophy dramatizes the ingress
that the social sciences have made in the defense establish-
ment in relation to threat assessment. Although this
particular school's unique methods of analyses are not
mathematically rigorous, it probably has more valid
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contributions in need of proper interpretation than any other
discipline today. (It is problematical to ascertain when
the language of communication between the social sciences
and systems analysis will develop to the extent that full-
fledged cooperation can exist. It seems most predictive that
mathematics will likely serve as the principle mode to fur-
ther this cooperation.)
On the whole, social science places emphasis on qualita-
tive research. Therefore, social scientists naturally use
this approach with respect to threat assessment. As a
vehicle for discussion of this method a study entitled, "The
Crisis Management Research Project" was selected to abstract:
Necessarily, this investigation emphasized the
influence of military factors on the psycho-political
processes of international relations in the Cold War.
One may, of course be reasonably certain that strate-
gic factors influence the thinking of decision-makers
in some manner, but this kind of understanding is man-
ifestly inadequate for the analysis and making of
national policy. To analyze a government's foreign
policy
,
answers to the following questions are needed:
Exactly who is influenced, in what direction, by which
military factors, and under what circumstances: What
psychological processes are at work in the minds of
individuals presumed to be "influenced"? Has U.S.
strategic superiority contained communist expansion,
forcing the Soviets to confront their own internal
crises, thus bringing about a detente ? Has U.S. stra-
tegic superiority tended to remove Soviet incentives
to crest international incidents and tension? How
does strategic superiority communicate itself or
,
rather , " get communicated" to opposing foreign policy -
makers ? What mix of strategic and tactical operations
credibly communicates to a potential aggressor the
resolve of the United States ? The Crisis Management
Research Project has sought to examine these and related
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51problems and to provide some solutions to them.
(Underscoring mine)
Contrasting this method to the political-military method
one senses a more rigorous approach to threat assessment.
Assumptions of the Project. The fundamental
intellectual perspectives of the Crisis Management
Research Project may now be summarized: The power
and security of the nation-state, and the objectives
it purports to achieve or enhance result in interac-
tions with other nations. The objectives which are
defended or pursued by a given nation are defined by
men representing the policy or state. Those who
act with authority in the name of the nation are
referred to as "decision-makers". Crises are initi-
ated, or recognized, prosecuted and resolved by such
decision-makers. To manage crises successfully is to
influence the decision-makers or other countries in a
favorable manner.
The conduct of decision-makers, is, at least in
part, a function of their perceptions about the capa-
bilities, actions and intentions of others, their own
values and perceived capabilities. These perceptions
are, in part, a function of the personality and
attitude set of the decision-makers.
The central purpose of this project is to evaluate
the influence of strategic forces on decision-making
during the management of crises. The models and
methodology of this project were designed to incorporate
conceptual clarity, scientific rigor and systematic anal-
ysis in order to facilitate further verification of this
study and its findings by others. 52 (Underscoring mine)
The explicit statement of the study's assumptions leave little
doubt in the mind of one especially familiar with the jargon
of psychology and sociology. Perhaps systems analysts in
their discipline cannot tolerate the lack of operational
5 Kintner, W. R. and Schwartz, D. C, "The Crisis Manage-
ment Research Project," A Study on Crisis Management , Foreign
Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania for the
Director of Plans, as an augmentation of Contract No. AF






definitions and the substitution of verbal vice mathematical
explanations. For example, the purpose of the project was
"to evaluate the influence of strategic forces" might trans-
late for a systems analyst as "to measure the range of the
threat of strategic forces." After substituting for
"influence," "the range of threat" an analyst would then
go on to operationally define what threat of strategic forces
entailed.
The declaration of assumptions and the use of concepts
assuming a primitive meaning is the approach of this method.
This approach however, is several magnitudes more rigorous
than the political-military approach.
The qualitative nature of this philosophy is a product
of the training of the scientists using it.
It may be well, at this point, to stress the
essentially qualitative aspect of this research .
Our indexes should not be taken for sophisticated
scales. Yet, they do convey some basic changes in
perceptual variables and provide the basis for
determining any patterns the variables assume in
crisis decision-making.
Each of the following perceptual factors were
treated in the same way. An index of factors or
information on which the perception was assumed
to be based was developed. The project staff rated
the degree to which the index would support a govern -
ment's perception of the variable in question .
7. Level of threat -"Threat " is more direct and
specific than "tension" and more observable than
"stress." Our index for threat was based on the
semantics of crisis communication (e.g., "serious,"
"grave," or "awesome") and situational fears (immedi-
ate nuclear attack on homeland, loss of bloc partner,
loss of strategic base, or loss of prestige).
8. Perceived opposing hostility . . .
9. Perceived likely allied response to crisis
policy . . .
10. Perceived likely neutral response to crisis
policy . . .
11. Perceived likely reaction of citizens to
crisis policy . . .
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12. Number of alternatives . . .
13. Receptivity to communication . . .
14. Centralization of decision-making . . .
15. Degree of change in established doctrine . . .
16. Intelligence . . .
17. Number of powers involved . . .
18. Directness of confrontation . . .
The basic method of research was to assess values
of each independent and dependent variable in each of
the three selected phases (initiation, peak, and
resolution) in each of the crises under study"! All
variables were weighted on a 0-10 scale. The nature
and direction of changes in each variable through
time were then apparent. Observable regular changes
in each of the fifteen dependent variables were cor-
related with each other and with changes in the three
independent variables. Similarities of directional
change between the independent and the dependent
variables were interpreted as variations in the per-
ception of strategic factors during crisis decision-
making. 53 (Underscoring mine)
The terminology of these types of studies is of specific
meaning to scientists versed in psychology and sociology.
The "0-10 scale" in this particular article is in the realm
of the systems analyst and its mention reveals the first
major drawback of this sort of study, the lack of mathemati-
cal rigor. The measurement of the variables, all on a "0-10
scale" make implicit assumptions. To begin, a 0-10 scale is
assumed arbitrary and therefore, ordinal. Also, it is not
clear that the "12. number of alternatives" and "13. recepti-
vity to communication" variables can be measured on the same
scale, or necessarily an ordinal scale. That is, is a 5.
for "12. number of alternatives" equal or of the same signif-
icance as a 5_ for "13. receptivity to communication"? One
would think not. This type of naive mathematical reasoning
53 Ibid.
, pp. 11-16 to 11-17
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is generally characteristic of this method. (The last para-
graph of the quote talks about correlation of dependent and
independent variables with themselves and each other.
Whether this is correlation in a rigorous (mathematical)
sense is not clear. If statistical correlation was used
then the significance of parametric statistical methods
applied to ordinal data is questioned.)
The model used in this school reflects this mathematical
naivety and is usually a way of thinking about the problem
as opposed to a rigorous model. It may be that the concepts
involved in threat quantification are so little understood
that mathematical model development is impossible at this
time. This remains for future investigative effort.
The model which suggests the selection and
integration of these variables is an attempt to
synthesize the major theoretical approaches in
international studies . Prom traditional assump-
tions in international politics, for example, the
notions of threat capability and use of weaponry,
have been taken. Thus, we can test the basic








what is is a function of basic
values and goals
The traditional or institutional approach to
international politics suggests the concepts of
centralization, doctrine, and intelligence. These
concepts are meaningful perceptual terms. The
responses of allies, neutrals, citizens, etc., will
affect the adoption of policies which derive from
centralization, doctrine and intelligence.
From these general considerations, a set of
concrete interrelated hypotheses were derived and
tested
. . . Some of the major hypotheses of the
Crisis Management Research Project are suggested
relationships between the perceptual variables in
the model of crisis decision-making discussed earlier
in this chapter. Here, we state these hypotheses
,
show how they derive from theory and observation, and
then examine the limits of their validity . In brief,
some of the basic general relationships between
strategic aerospace factors and crisis decision-
making are set forth. 5^ (Underscoring mine)
Here is the point where the political-military and the psycho-
political philosophies start to parallel one another. At
least, from this point on the psycho-political school uses
the same method as the political-military method. That is,
after the social scientist produces statements concerning the
assumptions, purposes, definitions, and hypotheses, he then
logically carries the reader to several conclusions through
the use of his discourse.
The specific allegations of the political-military anal-
yst do not appear in this method. In this method's conclu-
sions one sees the more conservative scientific demeanor of
the psycho-political practitioners.
General Conclusions. We do not assume that
strategic superiority can solve all crises or that
escalation theory can completely explain them.
Strategic superiority needs to be communicated to
be effective. Escalation calls for interpretation.
In brief, the threat of future strategic actions
must be credible.
The purpose of this study is to facilitate
assessment of the credibility and communications
requirements of crisis management . 55
The general nature of this school of threat assessment
is characterized by the case study. After setting down their
purposes and assumptions in detail, trained scientific ob-
servers collect data. Then hypotheses (after observation)
are constructed and "tested" in relation to what was observed
(in the language of the example, "here we state these
5ij
Ibid
. , pp. 11-17 to 11-18.
55 Ibid
. , pp. 11-22.
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hypotheses, show they derive from theory and observation
,
and then examine the limits of their validity").
The disadvantages of this method in relation to systems
analysis are its nonmathematically rigorous nature and use
of vocabulary that is specific to a highly developed
discipline
.
The deficiencies of the method from an analytical point
of view are parallel to the political-military method. The
measurement of the assessment process takes place in the
minds of men and it is extremely difficult to place magni-
tudes on the evaluations in these studies. (Since this method
presents several alternative states of the world in its con-
clusions, if one could enumerate the studies' assessments,
sensitivity analyses could be accomplished. This would be
difficult using the political-military approach.)
The manner in which social scientists derive their hypo-
theses must be questioned. Who is to say that the implanta-
tion of these hypotheses is not the ulterior motive of an
enemy power? That is, if one derives his hypotheses for
"testing" as the study states from " theory and observation ,
"
then the observations are necessarily the moves and counter-
moves of the enemy. To restate the question, how can one be
sure that these hypotheses are not elaborate plans construc-
ted by those one observes? How does one determine the inter-
actions between observer and observed? This cause and effect
relationship directly affects the value of this type of study.
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It seems that until one can determine the interactions
involved one cannot value this method in a proper manner.
C. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES-CONTENT ANALYSIS
This philosophy of threat assessment is in part a product
of the social sciences, the behavioral sciences in particular
There is one difference: the behavioral scientists who par-
take of this type of analysis use statistical procedures
to reach their conclusions, unlike the psycho-political
approach. These statistical procedures are called statis-
tical pattern recognition procedures in systems analysis.
(For an especially vivid explanation of this method of




Statistical pattern recognition is a method of deducing
patterns or signals in a data stream over time through the
use of statistical decision theory and probabilistic reason-
ing. In the case of the behavioral measures method of threat
estimation certain words or phrases or groups of words are
selected by the behavioral scientist as representative of a
particular concept. Sample data-streams are studied to em-
pirically determine the distribution of this concept through-
out written or spoken matter (if this is not feasible a
distribution is assumed) . Once this distribution is deter-
mined or assumed, statistical regions of acceptance or
rejection are determined based on Types I and II errors
selected by the experimenter through his use of decision
theory and its logic [See Ref. 6]. With these tools at hand
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the behavioral scientist can insert entire texts of messages,
writings, articles or speeches from the country in which he
is interested into a statistical computer program. This
program is designed to test statistically for the presence
of the concept. The scientist's selection of the words or
phrasing as representative of a concept is much like setting
up a scale. The more subdivisions of the concept, the finer
one is able to "measure" the level of the presence of con-
ceptual patterns
.
Briefly, this method is termed content analysis in the
behavioral sciences. There are several methods of applica-
tion of this analysis not necessarily involving the use of
a computer. The term thematic content analysis (thematic
defined as: of or relating to the stem of a word or consti-
tuting a theme) is usually applied to written material.
Content analysis is applied to visual material. The history
of content analysis is a long one but the application of
statistical pattern recognition procedures in conjunction
56
with content analysis is novel.
Loubert and Stacey [Ref. 27] in their review of five
of the original papers using statistical content analysis
comment on the complexity of the problem of assessment and
56 Loubert, J. D. and Stacey, C. H., Project Michelson
Studies of Communist China : An Examination of the Relevance
of Selected Findings
, A technical report prepared under
contract for Group Psychology Branch Psychological Sciences
Division, Office of Naval Research, HSR-TN-6613-CS (Human
Sciences Research, Inc., July, 1966), p. 1.
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bring up a fundamental question concerning the method of
statistical content analysis:
After careful examination of the various studies,
it became apparent to HSR [Human Sciences Research,
Inc.], analysts that the authors were wrestling with
a particularly difficult problem in the behavioral
analysis of political affairs. In dealing with spe-
cific events (crises) where a minimum of reliable
information is available, how can we move from even
the simplest level of abstraction to an evaluation of
the "reality world" of one of the principal actors?
In the North series, the authors apparently were
using the following adaptation of the classical S-O-R
paradigm: The crises are the Stimuli, the Peking
leadership is the mediating Organism which evaluates
the crises through its perceptual filters, and the
Responses are the official statements which purportedly
describe these perceptions and announce Peking's re-
actions. In the McClelland studies the Responses
included both Peking's statements and physical acts
(Attack, Withdraw, etc.). As such, the McClelland
studies appear to provide greater assurance of re-
liability since discrepancies between threats and
actions can shed light on bluffing tactics. In both
studies, additionally, the authors studied the actual
crises to determine if the facts supported or discon-
firmed their quantitative findings.
The fundamental question still remains, however :
"With necessarily fragmentary information of the
circumstances involved, can the authors of these
studies move from the measurement of Chinese hostility
to an explanation of its causes ?"b>T~
(Underscoring and comments in brackets mine)
The shortcomings of this method are clearly pointed out by
Loubert and Stacey: Can the causes of hostility or threat
be ferreted out of written or visual material? Can behavioral
scientists Isolate the unintended messages contained in
official communications and the implicit patterns underlying




Loubert and Stacey warn their readers:
Despite the many problems which beset the novel
approach to the analysis of international relations,
the studies of North, et_ al. and McClelland, et_ al.
contain preliminary indications that behavioral
scientists can take ordinary published materials from
open sources, subject them to sophisticated statis-
tical analysis, and come up with potentially valuable
insights for decision-makers and their support staffs.
They can do this because they are looking for and
finding the unintended messages contained in official
communications and the implicit patterns of inter-
national actions. Although the present state of the
art is not such as to produce results which can be
used with confidence, such insights into the behavioral
patterns of foreign leaders can become valuable to our
decision-makers, to the extent that their validity and
reliability is demonstrated. In any case, the authors
of these studies should be commended for demonstrating
courage in addressing themselves to the most complex
aspect (crises) of international relations. 58
The shortcoming of this method, in the eyes of systems anal-
ysts, is that of communications. The scales that behavioral
scientists construct do not reflect the purposes of systems
analysts. The relative or absolute magnitudes of the concepts
involved are not determinable without communicable scaling
procedures between disciplines. Again as in the psycho-
political approach, the highly developed jargon of behavioral
scientists does not convey the same meaning to systems
analysts
.
D. SUBJECTIVE MEASURES-EXPERT OPINION QUANTIFIED
If one accepts the premise that learned men in a parti-
cular field (or so-called experts) can be harbingers of
future events of their particular discipline, one agrees with
58 Ibid
this method which also accepts this hypothesis.
In this context, subjective measures means the use of
mens' minds as measuring devices in a methodical and repro-
ducible manner. Therefore, implicit to this philosophy is
the assumption that the answers or proper measures can be
solicited from mankind. Of course, this is not an original
premise, it is as old as man and his decision-making. Men
make their decisions by mental processes that one would think
are biased by their total experiences and their present and
self-predicted environments.
The most sophisticated decision-makers who use complex
analyses and answers also implicitly believe in this method.
Given several alternatives a decision-maker must make a de-
cision. The valuation of the best decision by the decision-
maker is an individual subjective measurement. In other
words, the decision-maker values alternatives mentally by
his own unique mental processes. He then selects as his
alternative the one with highest value .
There exists several methods for dealing with these
valuations (which will be called opinions here). Campbell
[Ref. 35], Brown and Helmer [Ref. 29], Dalkey [Ref. 34],
Gordon and Helmer [Ref. 32], and Maier [Ref. 24], discussed
methods of dealing with opinions. The method developed by
the scientists at the RAND Corporation called the Delphi
technique and espoused by N. C. Dalkey is used here for
purposes of discourse.
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The salient features of the Delphi technique are that it
dampens interactions caused by face-to-face confrontation of
men in discussions. It allows individuals not to be subjected
to dominant individuals or group pressures. It also allows
the noise factor that group discussion creates to be
discarded.
Dalkey describes his method in a paper entitled appro-
priately, "Looking into the Future":
The basic characteristics of the Delphi procedures
are: (a) Anonymity, (b) Interaction with controlled
feedback, (c) Statistical group response. Anonymity
is achieved by using questionnaires or other formal
channels of communication, where specific responses
are not associated with individual members of the
group. This is a way of cutting down on the effects
of dominant individuals and reducing group pressure.
Interaction consists in performing the interaction
among members of the group in several stages; typically,
at the beginning of each stage the results of the pre-
vious stage are summarized and fed back to the members
of the group, and they are then asked to reassess their
answers in light of what the entire group thought on
the previous round. Controlled feedback allows inter-
action with a large reduction in noise. Finally,
rather than asking the group to arrive at a common
opinion, a consensus, the group opinion is taken to
be a statistical average of the final opinions of
individual members of the group. In the experiments
we have conducted, the median opinion-that is the
middle estimate where half the group is on one side,
and half on the other-has turned out to be the most
accurate. By using a statistical group opinion, group
pressure toward conformity is further reduced, and
probably more important, the opinion of every member
is reflected in the group response. 59
As previously mentioned the subjective measure has been
the manner by which man has solved his problems throughout
his existence. Prior to the so-called scientific method
59 Dalkey, N. C, Predicting the Future (RAND Corporation




men relied on their judgments, whether individual or col-
lective. The construction of the scientific method of
laboriously presenting evidence supporting one's conclusions
has judgments as the glue which holds it together, that is,
men and scientists make qualitative judgments. Judgments
color all human activity, even science.
The Delphi technique and the subjective measures philo-
sophy it represents is a method that carefully uses the
opinions of men in a manner that can be controlled and
reproduced in part. Whether the answers to threat prediction
and assessment can be acquired using this method remains to
be seen but as Dalkey points out, there is reason for
optimism.
Let me sum up: Opinion plays a basic role in long
range forecasting of technological and social develop-
ment. The traditional ways of dealing with opinion
have significant drawbacks. Our experiments have shown
that it is possible to design techniques for putting
the opinions of a group of individuals together that
avoid some of these drawbacks. However, the improve-
ment is small.
The next step is to see whether we can dampen the
effects of group pressure, in this case excessive
convergence, and amplify the movement toward the true
answer. We have to wait on further experiments to
see whether these are possible, but we have some
grounds for optimism. °0
Although this method has not been directly applied to the
assessment of threat present or future, it seems a promising
one because the type of answers can be tailored by the types
of questions used in connection with the method. Answers





The shortcomings that are anticipated in connection with
the use of subjective measures are major ones. How does one
go about selecting the experts to question with the subjec-
tive measures technique? And if this problem is solved, does
the answer lie in the minds of these experts? Presently,
these questions are devoid of practical significance because
as yet no way exists to verify the method in its present
crude stage of development. Once a theory of subjective
measures is developed, it seems likely that this method can
play a major role in the assessment of threat. (As a side-
light the reader is reminded of the problem that was discussed
in Section V, page 53, that concerned the difficulty systems
analysts have presently in interfacing with the decision-
makers they serve. Subjective measures methods could pres-
ently have direct application to this problem.)
E. SYSTEMS ANALYTIC METHODS
It is not the purpose of this section as in the preceding
four, to outline the methods used by systems analysts to
assess threat for use in studies by the defense establish-
ment. The task is far too complex to attempt here. The
factors that complicate such a task are many. First, many
diverse methods are used and no single method can be used
to represent all of the others. Secondly, this paper has
implicitly rejected present methodologies used in connection
with the quantification of threat. Third, since access to the
decision-makers in high-level defense positions can be ob-
tained only by dint of the authority of these same
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decision-makers this access was regarded as impossible for
the purpose of this paper. Without this access the trace of
how threat assessment actually takes place today in the
Defense Department must remain indecipherable.
The purpose of this section is to point up the problem,
that of tracing how threat assessment takes place in the
Defense Department, and comment on why it is of concern
(this paper also is submitted to lie in evidence of this same
problem)
.
Prior to the introduction of the planning, programming
and budgeting system in the Defense Department, the budget
level for defense was set by the Chief Executive. Secretary
McNamara's attempt to make the defense budget a numerical
reflection of political purposes has prompted this study.
Since the early sixties defense decision-makers have striven
to provide for the common defense in a manner reflecting the
threats to this nation. The method that these decision-
makers use to recognize these threats is not clear however.
The National Security Council and its members generate policy
for the guidance of the defense establishment. For security
reasons the construction of these policies and many times the
policies themselves are not published. It is questionable
whether any documentation exists setting forth the method
whereby the National Security Council (with inputs from the
Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, State Depart'
ment and various other government and private agencies)
assesses threats to this country. It is doubtful that if
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such documentation existed, it would contain the highly
personal decision processes unique to the members of this
council (The National Security Council is composed of the
President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of
Emergency Preparations).
It is important that efforts be made to fill in the gaps
in knowledge concerning how individual defense policy deci-
sions relate to the spectrum of threats faced by this
country, because of the paramount importance of the need to
discover the spectrum of threats to this country.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
This developmental paper's method has been to use dis-
course and example to attempt to heuristically define little-
understood problems. At this time it can be concluded that
these problems are not only little-understood and extremely
complex, but that this present paper is woefully incomplete.
This paper has used propaedeutic discussions touching on
many disciplines outside the confines of systems analysis
because of the nature of the problem researched. To con-
clude at this time that systems analytic techniques or
its practitioners will be able to construct a method to
properly assess threats to this country is folly. It can be
concluded that the efforts of many disciplines will most
surely be needed.
Further efforts to investigate threat assessment as
practiced today in the defense establishment coupled with
comprehensive efforts to document and evaluate these types
of assessments are needed to form a data-base. From this
data-base efforts to construct a realistic, pragmatic, and
effective methodology that would be capable of outlining
threats to this country could be conducted. To date, docu-
mentation of threat assessment methods is scarce. Few papers
deal with this problem as an entity. Once must interpret
methods from many and varied sources that use techniques of
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threat assessment as a method to solve what is considered a
subproblem, inferior to the document's main themes. The
conclusion here is that until scholars consider this
problem by itself and generate research in relation to threat
assessment, efforts, such as this one are doomed to inade-
quacy because of the bare spots that are left in the analysis
that could not be spared any allocation of effort. These bare
spots cannot be filled in by others' efforts because none
exist
.
This paper has not dealt with the enormous number of
practical problems that plague defense planners in relation
to threat assessment. It has never defined threat or assess-
ment. It has not exhaustively listed present government
sources that might contribute to a theory of threat assess-
ment; nor has it listed the possible disciplines that should
be enlisted in an effort to solve this problem. What this
paper has attempted to do by side-stepping these very real
and important problems is to make them meaningful by ex-
ploration of the structure of threat assessment. Once one
can perceive the structure of the threat assessment process,
it is anticipated that one can conclude that enormous
difficulties lie in the path of the investigator.
The understanding of nature by mankind is of epic pro-
portions at this writing. Man's understanding of the
phenomenon of man and the phenomena of man in relation to his
works is in a crude state of development. In fact, the ages
of the development of mankind are named after many of the
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constructs of man because of the vast changes in man's
life that these man-made items have generated. We have lived
in the Nuclear Age for a generation but the effects of nu-
clear fission cannot be foretold by mankind. Heisenberg
attempted to state his position in relation to how man might
finally understand physical nature in 1932.
I have attempted to show how physics and chemistry-
driven, we hardly know by what force-have continuously
developed in the direction of a mathematical analysis
of nature under the guiding principle of unification.
The claims of our science to an understanding of nature,
in the original sense of the word, have at the same time
decreased. The attempt to prove impossible a perception-
theoretical understanding of the latter kind, and to
prove mathematical analysis the only possible way,
appears to me as unwise as the opposite assertion, that
an understanding of nature can be achieved in a philo-
sophical way without a knowledge of its formal laws. 61
Given that man's understanding is in a crude stage of devel-
opment in relation to understanding the phenomena of man-
kind related to his works, this paper concludes that no
method of assessing threat can necessarily be developed with-
out further progress by science attempting to understand the
phenomena of man and his works.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Reallocation of Research Efforts Within Systems
Studies
Since the estimation of threat seems to be the basis
for most systems analysts, further effort should be allo-
cated to discover proper methods of threat assessment. The
"-1
- Heisenberg, W., Philosophic Problems of Nuclear
Science (Pantheon Books, Inc., 1952), pp. 39-40.
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crude and over-hasty estimation of threat not only over-
simplified a complex concept but invalidates conclusions




Investigation into the abstract fundamentals of the
phenomena of threat are needed if rigorous development of
models similar to those presently used in systems analyais
can ever be accomplished. A most meaningful addition to the
tools presently available to systems analysts would be a
calculus of threat assessment coupled with operational
theorems developed from axioms of the calculus.
3 Threat Assessment Relevant to Present Policy Planning
The discovery and documentation of the actual working
method presently used by the defense establishment including
the National Security Council is a paramount goal. This
documentation can find use as a staring point to value
methods or philosophies that already exist in relation to
threat assessment. This documentation could be accomplished
with minimal use of resources and manpower. It is recommended
that prior to further research into different methodologies
the present one be discovered.
C. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1 . Increasing the Effectiveness of Judgment and Intuition
Since the defense establishment involves itself in-
creasingly with problems, with no known scientific methods
to handle them, it seems that the enhancement of judgments,
intuition and opinion of defense decision-makers must be
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attempted through the use of methods such as Delphi. (See
Section VI, Part D) . It is proposed that research into a
practical plan for application of this method or a method
especially tailored for the Department of Defense be con-
structed. This research could be as basic as the formula-
tion of a plan of which particular decision-makers should be
called on for judgments concerning what general class of
problem. A more complex approach would develop a plan for a
section or department whose sole concern would be qualitative
judgment sampling on a permanent scale within the government
establishment on a par with the various departments. This
department's job might be to develop threat indexes similar
to the Dow-Jones Averages. Indexes could be investigated
and research conducted on how to construct indexes for use
by the military, the intelligence agencies, the State Depart-
ment and the Defense Department. It is anticipated that an
index constructed for the State Department would not be
compatible with one made for use by systems analysts in the
Defense Department.
2 . Data-Base Investigation
To further efforts between disciplines that seem to
be of future help In the problem of threat assessments, it
is proposed that the knowledge of human and group behavior
found in psychology, sociology and related behavioral
sciences be developed in a form that could be rigorously
applied. That is, develop operational definitions of con-
cepts enjoyed in these disciplines, document the general
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results of pertinent studies already carried out by these
disciplines in such a form as to be of use by defense anal-
ysts. This type of research could be of a survey form
conducted by a systems analyst in conjunction with a
behavioral scientist. Lazarsfeld points up this problem:
In addition to training and creative work there
is a third road. We need investigations which
clarify in a more general way the possible relations
between mathematics and the social sciences. We
should take specific problems and look at them with
the end in mind of understanding better how the
structure of behavioral science thinking and the
structure of various mathematical methods fit each
other. It is along this line that the present volume
intends to make its main contribution. ^
3 . The Conduct of Research to Relate National Goals to
the Threats to These Goals
This research would probably be a listing, as exhaus-
tive as possible, of National Goals. These National Goals
then could be related to threats to them. The purpose of
this type of research would be to help canalize Defense
Department thinking along these lines so that their inter-
pretation of the common defense in relation to the desires of
the American people would be adequate.
4
. Derivation of a Horizon for Predictive Problem
Purposes
This research would endeavor to develop a planning
horizon to use in various predictive problems which concern
defense analysts. For example, is it feasible to expand
resources to cost-out large programs? If so, how far into
the future is it practical to attempt accurate costing?
f\ ?
Lazarsfeld, P. P. (ed) , Mathematical Thinking in the
Social Sciences (The Free Press" 195^ ) , P • 5
.
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Is there a cost horizon that beyond this time little can
be gained in attempting to estimate project costs?
This sort of research can concern itself with cost
horizons, contingency plan horizons (for example, is the
five year time frame a feasible one for the five year joint
strategic plan?), and program effectiveness horizons.
5 . Meta-Logic for Threat Assessment
As the final proposal for research it is recommended
that investigation be conducted into why certain method(s)
is ( are ) necessarily the correct one(s) to apply to the
assessment of threat.
For example, simulation techniques on high speed
computers were developed to get answers to problems that
would have been astronomically expensive if trials had been
attempted from which to extract data. The validity of
simulation methods are in question today while their verifi-
cation is relatively simple. The reason is that a meta-logic
to construct the logic of simulation has not been formulated.
Therefore, validating a simulation with respect to the
phenomena it represents is formidable.
Similarly, the assessment of threat has heretofore
taken place or been simulated largely in the minds of men.
If a method possessing scientific rigor can be developed, it
must be validated that it actually represents the real world.
This job would be several magnitudes simpler if a logic or
calculus of threat assessment could be constructed. The
construction of this logic must be preceded by a meta-logic
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